This piece looks at how top leaders are chosen and groomed in different systems—from Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) to China’s Communist Party of China (CPC), and even the papal election in the Catholic Church. It explores how small, elite groups shape leadership, maintain stability, and ensure continuity, showing that behind every leadership transition is a careful mix of merit, loyalty, and strategy.
Leadership Selection and Succession Practices in Singapore’s PAP
The People’s Action Party (PAP) of Singapore began as a mass mobilization party modeled on Leninist principles, a structure that continues to influence the party’s organization today. At the helm of the PAP is the Central Executive Committee (CEC), led by the secretary-general, who is typically also the Prime Minister of Singapore. The selection of the secretary-general, akin to a highly secretive process, is carried out by party peers within the CEC, somewhat reminiscent of how the College of Cardinals elects a pope in the Catholic Church.
From the late 1970s, Lee Kuan Yew implemented regular lunches with younger-generation leaders to gauge their capabilities and perspectives. These sessions included Goh Chok Tong, Lim Chee Onn, Dr. Tony Tan, and occasionally S. Dhanabalan. While Goh and Lim were closely involved in party organizational work, Dr. Tony Tan lunched separately with Lee due to his lesser involvement in party operations. Lee was particularly interested in the younger ministers’ views of one another and often asked them to submit written rankings of their peers, deliberately excluding themselves, to inform his understanding of internal dynamics.
The process of leadership succession within the PAP was carefully managed. Lee himself had a private preference for Dr. Tony Tan as his successor, a view known only to a close circle including Goh Chok Tong. Despite this, Lee was deliberate in avoiding directly selecting his successor, believing that the likelihood of success was greater if a group of capable individuals contended among themselves. This approach allowed the party to identify the most suitable leader organically, ensuring both stability and continuity in Singapore’s political leadership.
Elite-Driven Leadership: PAP’s Cadre System Compared to the Papal Conclave
The People’s Action Party (PAP) operates under a highly disciplined and cohesive structure, characterized by a top-down leadership system and a powerful organizational machinery on the ground. The party’s constitution establishes two classes of membership: ordinary members, who may join through the headquarters or local branches, and cadre members, a select group approved by the Central Executive Committee (CEC). This institutionalized cadre system ensures that control of the party remains tightly centralized.[1][2]
Only cadre members chosen by the CEC are entitled to vote for candidates to the CEC, creating a self-reinforcing loop of authority. This structure is often likened to the papal election in the Catholic Church, where only cardinals, themselves appointed by the Pope, may elect a new Pope. Both systems are elite-driven, secretive, and consensus-oriented, designed to maintain continuity, stability, and legitimacy within their respective institutions.
While the underlying principles of control and stability are similar, the scope and purpose differ. The PAP functions as the leadership of a political party within a single-party system, focusing on governance and political continuity, whereas the papal conclave governs a religious institution with a global spiritual mandate. Despite these differences, both processes reflect a careful balance of authority, tradition, and the prevention of external interference in the selection of leadership.
Justification for Non-One-Man-One-Vote
Lee Kuan Yew frequently drew an analogy between the governance of Singapore and the election of the pope to justify the country’s centralized and non-democratic aspects of leadership selection. He noted that, much like the Catholic Church, which entrusts the choice of its leader to a small body of cardinals rather than ordinary members, large and complex organizations often rely on elite selection processes to ensure competent and stable leadership. This comparison served to frame Singapore’s deviation from a one-man-one-vote system as a rational, results-oriented approach rather than an authoritarian imposition.
Central to Lee’s argument was the notion of meritocratic selection. He maintained that capable leadership could best be identified by peers who deeply understood the intricacies of governance, rather than through mass electoral processes that might prioritize popularity over competence. By limiting leadership selection to those with relevant expertise and experience, Singapore could ensure continuity, stability, and the capacity for long-term planning—qualities he regarded as essential for a small, developing nation navigating complex economic and geopolitical challenges.
Lee also emphasized the value of consensus over popularity in leadership transitions. Drawing on the pope analogy, he suggested that internal deliberation and consensus-building among party leaders would produce leaders most suited to serve the nation’s interests. This approach, he argued, would mitigate the risks of factionalism, instability, and short-term populism that could arise from open, popular votes within the party. For Lee, the ultimate priority was effective and stable governance, rather than the extension of universal suffrage to every level of party leadership.
Lee Kuan Yew presented Singapore’s non-one-man-one-vote system as a pragmatic strategy for cultivating capable, stable, and forward-looking leadership. By framing it as meritocratic and consensus-driven, he positioned the approach as a deliberate choice aimed at safeguarding the nation’s long-term interests, rather than a mere rejection of democratic norms.
Elite-Guided Selection and Election in Religious and Political Systems
The systems of leadership selection in the Catholic Church, Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP), and the Communist Party of China (CPC) share a common reliance on pre-existing elites to shape future leadership. In the Catholic Church, the pope is elected by the College of Cardinals, a body appointed by previous popes. This ensures continuity in values and governance while maintaining the legitimacy of the leader among followers. Similarly, in the PAP, the Central Executive Committee (CEC) is composed of cadres whose selection reflects the values and priorities of past leadership, thereby guiding the party’s future direction. In the CPC, the Politburo selects members of the Central Committee, which in turn elects the Politburo, creating a closed, hierarchical system in which leadership legitimacy is derived from party loyalty, internal consensus, and adherence to established ideology.
In both the PAP and the CPC, the selection process emphasizes competence, loyalty, and alignment with the party’s ideological framework. The PAP’s ideology is pragmatic, economically liberal yet socially conservative, meritocratic, multicultural, and nationalist, with strong state influence over governance and economic planning. The CPC similarly preserves continuity in ideology and governance through frameworks established by past leaders, including Xi Jinping Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, Mao Zedong Thought, the Three Represents, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, meritocracy, “China Dream”, self-reliance, and technological sovereignty, etc. By embedding ideological continuity into leadership selection, both systems prioritize stable, experienced leadership over popular election, ensuring that leaders align with long-term strategic goals.
The cadre systems in both parties inherently limit the introduction of radically different perspectives, favoring the promotion of like-minded individuals. This closed-loop selection helps maintain stability but carries the risk of groupthink. Nevertheless, both systems demonstrate flexibility within these constraints: Singapore balances pragmatic governance with meritocracy, while China’s economic reforms reflect adaptability rather than rigid ideological adherence, allowing the country to maintain rapid economic growth under centralized political control.
Across all three systems—the papal election, the PAP’s CEC, and the CPC’s Central Committee/Politburo—the legacy of previous leaders is central in shaping succession. Whether spiritual, political, or ideological, continuity is maintained through elite consensus rather than popular vote, underscoring the enduring influence of prior leadership. The process of “selection and election” in these systems thus combines the principles of merit, loyalty, and ideological alignment to safeguard stability, continuity, and governance effectiveness.
How the CPC Selects, Develops, and Rotates Its Political Cadres
The Communist Party of China (CPC) maintains a highly structured and centralized system for selecting, grooming, promoting, rotating, and evaluating cadres—the backbone of China’s political and administrative apparatus. Entry into this system typically begins at universities, workplaces, local governments, or military institutions, where candidates must already be Party members. Selection emphasizes ideological loyalty, competence, and moral integrity. Local party committees conduct rigorous vetting, considering political reliability, educational background, and work or party performance. Talented individuals are often identified early as “reserve cadres” for future leadership roles.
Promotion within the CPC system balances merit and loyalty. Cadres advance based on performance in assigned roles, administrative competence, and economic results, particularly at local or provincial levels, while also demonstrating political fidelity to the Party and alignment with dominant factions. Key promotions require approval from higher-level party committees, and career advancement can be significantly influenced by factional affiliation. Misalignment with prevailing political currents, conversely, can stall a promising career despite strong performance.
Grooming and training are central to cadre development. The Party operates institutions such as the Central Party School in Beijing, where cadres receive instruction in Marxist theory, governance, party policies, and leadership skills. On-the-job mentorship is another critical component, with young cadres working under experienced leaders to acquire practical knowledge in management, policy-making, and political maneuvering. To build versatility, cadres are rotated across sectors—including industry, local government, and central ministries—ensuring exposure to diverse administrative challenges.
Rotation serves multiple strategic purposes: it prevents localism and corruption, broadens experience across regions and administrative levels, and tests leadership adaptability. Typical career paths progress from local offices to provincial or ministerial roles and ultimately to central leadership positions, including the Politburo or top central ministries. Mid-level cadres experience frequent rotations, while senior leaders rotate more selectively, often across provinces or ministries to gain strategic exposure.
Cadres are continuously evaluated and monitored through regular performance reviews, which assess political reliability, adherence to party directives, and administrative effectiveness. Reporting and accountability mechanisms link promotions, demotions, or removals to a combination of performance, loyalty, and factional considerations. The CPC’s Central Organization Department maintains oversight over the entire system, controlling appointments and career trajectories to ensure that leaders are both competent and politically reliable.
Overall, the CPC’s cadre system combines centralized control with structured meritocracy, extensive training, rotational exposure, and factional considerations. Its design seeks to cultivate leaders who are ideologically aligned, politically loyal, and administratively capable, ensuring that the Party retains both control and continuity across all levels of governance.
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Centralized Authority and China’s Civilizational Resilience
Understanding the CPC: China’s Leadership as a “West Point” System
A more accurate way to understand the Communist Party of China (CPC) is through the lens of meritocracy rather than ideology. Historically, China has operated under systems in which governance relied on a bureaucratic elite: first under the emperors, and later under a professional civil service. Today, the CPC functions similarly—entry and advancement within the Party are closely tied to demonstrated ability and performance. For example, gaining admission to Tsinghua University, one of China’s premier institutions, is extraordinarily competitive: out of roughly 10 million students who take the National College Entrance Exam each year, only about 3,000 are admitted. Graduates from this small cohort disproportionately occupy leadership positions across the country. The emphasis on rigorous testing and achievement, a feature of Chinese educational culture for over two millennia, directly supports this meritocratic system.
To provide a point of comparison that might resonate with Western observers, the only institution in the United States that approximates the CPC’s combination of cohesion, performance-based advancement, and long-term professional networks is the U.S. military. Imagine attending West Point together at age 18, committing your careers to the military, and rising through the ranks over decades. By the time you reach the highest levels of leadership, you would have worked closely with the same peers for 40 years, sharing professional experience and mutual trust. Advancement is earned on merit, failure carries real consequences, and the culture naturally includes competition and internal rivalries.[3]
In this light, the term “communism” in the name “Communist Party of China” can be misleading for many Americans. The CPC is not primarily an ideological or collectivist organization in the conventional sense of communism; rather, it operates as a highly structured, performance-oriented meritocracy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the leadership selection and succession practices of Singapore’s PAP and China’s CPC illustrate how elite-driven, meritocratic systems can prioritize stability, continuity, and competence over mass participation. Both parties rely on carefully managed cadre networks to identify, groom, and rotate leaders, ensuring alignment with long-term strategic goals and institutional values. Comparisons with the papal conclave and Western meritocratic institutions, such as U.S. military academies, highlight that these systems, while centralized and opaque, are designed to cultivate capable leadership through experience, loyalty, and internal consensus rather than popular vote. Ultimately, these models underscore a shared emphasis on continuity, disciplined governance, and the deliberate shaping of future leaders to safeguard institutional and national interests.
References
[1] Constitution of the People’s Action Party, https://www.pap.org.sg/party-constitution/
[2] “One View Over a Thousand: Singapore’s Cadre System”, September 5, 2013, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/one-view-over-a-thousand-singapores-cadre-system-4852/
[3] “Distinguished Lecture: Navigating the Future of US-China Relations”, John Thornton, April 28, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgUX82Vh_8I