In The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West (2025), Alexander C. Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska argue that the United States, particularly Silicon Valley, has the potential to revive a mission-driven technological culture, but only by breaking free from the ideological constraints that have dominated since the 1980s. These include market fundamentalism, anti-statism, technocratic neutrality, and the myth of a self-regulating digital marketplace. The U.S.–China tech rivalry, far from a model to emulate, serves as a mirror reflecting America’s own technological stagnation, signaling the urgent need for systemic reorientation. Such a revival requires more than rhetoric—it necessitates a new political framework that aligns technology with long-term national interests, including national security, social stability, public welfare, and economic resilience. This challenge mirrors past historical inflection points, like FDR’s New Deal or Reagan’s restructuring after stagflation, where crises demanded ideological recalibration and institutional innovation.
China as a Mirror: The U.S. Technological Awakening
In The Technological Republic (2025), Alexander C. Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska argue that while China’s rapid technological advancements—particularly in AI, semiconductors, drones, and industrial scaling—highlight critical vulnerabilities within the U.S., the Chinese model itself should not be seen as a solution to America’s challenges. Rather than advocating for the adoption of China’s authoritarian system, Karp and Zamiska present China as a “stress test” for American innovation and policy. The question they raise is provocative: if a closed society like China can mobilize technology for national purposes, what justifies an open society like the U.S. failing to do the same?
China’s technological success is not the result of spontaneous market forces or decentralized innovation, but of strategic state–industry alignment and a clear, mission-driven approach to technology as an integral part of national infrastructure. By treating technology as more than just consumer products, China has focused on using it to advance national interests, ensuring its technological ecosystem is closely aligned with state objectives. This stands in stark contrast to the U.S., where technological development has often been driven by market forces and individual entrepreneurial initiatives, with less emphasis on the coordinated national purpose that China has embraced.
However, the U.S. is not without its strengths. The challenge presented by China’s rise should not be viewed as an existential threat, but as a call to action for American renewal. Just as the Great Depression and the stagflation of the 1970s forced the U.S. to rethink its ideological and institutional structures, the current U.S.–China rivalry provides a similar moment for recalibration. Unlike China, the U.S. can pursue a technological future within the framework of its democratic ideals, aligning innovation with national security, public welfare, and social stability. The question is not whether to imitate China, but whether the U.S. can renew its own technological mission in a way that supports long-term, broad-based resilience.
Ideological Barriers to Revival
Revival is blocked less by lack of money or talent than by ideas that became dogma after 1991.
A. The Limits of Market Fundamentalism in U.S. Technological Strategy
The belief that free markets alone efficiently allocate capital has led to significant gaps in critical technological sectors within the U.S. This market fundamentalism has resulted in chronic underinvestment in foundational research and development (R&D), crucial infrastructure, and dual-use technologies, such as advanced semiconductors, AI safety, and quantum sensing. As a result, the U.S. faces “innovation deserts” in areas vital for national security, energy, and public-interest technologies. The emphasis on market-driven solutions has also hindered investment in technologies that are essential not only for economic growth but also for ensuring the nation’s long-term resilience and global competitiveness.
To address these gaps, the U.S. must move beyond the notion that markets alone can solve these problems and instead embrace a more strategic industrial policy. This approach does not imply a socialist system but calls for pragmatic statecraft that recognizes the critical need for government coordination and investment in strategic sectors. Recent initiatives such as the CHIPS and Science Act (2022) and the Inflation Reduction Act (2022) signal a shift toward this type of policy, though they remain fragmented and underfunded. Looking back to the Cold War era, the U.S. successfully subordinated markets to strategic ends in defense procurement, university grants, and tax incentives, providing a model for how industrial policy can be leveraged to advance national goals without fully abandoning market dynamics.
B. Overcoming Anti-Statism: Reimagining the Role of Government in U.S. Innovation
The deep cultural suspicion of government in the United States, rooted in post-Vietnam disillusionment and reinforced by the libertarian ethos of Silicon Valley, has long undermined the legitimacy of public coordination in technological development. Figures like Steve Jobs, who famously portrayed government as slow, corrupt, and oppressive, helped cultivate a pervasive belief that public sector involvement stifles innovation. This anti-statist sentiment has created a self-paralyzing perception, preventing meaningful collaboration between the state and the private sector in addressing national technological challenges.
To overcome this, it is essential to reframe the role of the state not as a bureaucratic obstacle, but as a mission-oriented investor and integrator. A historical example of this approach is DARPA, which succeeded by defining critical problems, de-risking research, and fostering collaboration between government labs and private industry. The state’s role should not be about controlling innovation, but rather about creating the conditions for breakthrough discoveries. This requires a cultural shift in which engineers and technologists see themselves not just as entrepreneurs but as stewards of national technological sovereignty, tasked with advancing the country’s strategic interests through innovation and collaboration with the public sector.
C. Beyond Technological Neutrality: Reclaiming Moral Responsibility in Innovation
A defining assumption of contemporary Silicon Valley culture is that technology is inherently neutral—an idea reinforced by slogans such as “move fast and break things.” This posture of technological agnosticism treats tools and platforms as value-free, overlooking how design choices actively shape democratic institutions, labor relations, public discourse, and national security. In reality, technologies are never merely instruments; they embed priorities, incentives, and power structures. Artificial intelligence systems developed for targeted advertising, for instance, can be readily adapted for surveillance, social control, or military applications, underscoring the fallacy of moral neutrality in technological development.
Correcting this imbalance requires a deliberate integration of public-interest criteria into the innovation process. Principles such as transparency, auditability, robustness, and societal impact must become core design requirements rather than afterthoughts. This shift cannot rely on voluntary ethics alone; it demands institutional innovation. One proposal is the creation of a National Technology Council, modeled on the National Security Council, to coordinate civilian, military, and technological strategy and ensure coherence between innovation and national priorities.
More broadly, this reorientation points to a necessary ideological shift. The United States must recover a civic-technological ethos in which innovation is understood as a civilizational project, not merely a vehicle for shareholder value or market dominance. Technology should be evaluated not only by its efficiency or profitability, but by its contribution to democratic resilience, social stability, and the long-term public good. Only by rejecting the myth of neutrality can technological power be aligned with moral responsibility and national purpose.
The Strategic Case for a Technological Revival
Any meaningful revival of American technological power must be grounded in a clear strategic logic rather than abstract innovation rhetoric. At its core, this renewal requires aligning technological development with national security, economic resilience, public interest, and social stability. China’s rise functions less as a blueprint than as a warning, exposing the costs of strategic drift and forcing the United States to reconsider how technology serves national ends rather than narrow commercial objectives.
From a security perspective, the priority is restoring leadership in critical and dual-use technologies. Artificial intelligence for defense applications, autonomous systems, drone swarms, and secure semiconductor supply chains are no longer optional capabilities but foundational elements of national power. Mission-oriented programs modeled on DARPA can once again focus research and development on hard problems that markets alone are unlikely to solve, ensuring that civilian innovation and defense preparedness reinforce one another.
Economic resilience is equally central to this strategic rationale. Dependence on foreign sources for essential technologies—such as advanced chips, batteries, and rare-earth materials—has become a structural vulnerability. Rebuilding domestic production capacity, securing supply chains, and retaining high-end technical talent are necessary not only for competitiveness but for sovereignty. Strategic investment and industrial coordination can mitigate these risks without abandoning market mechanisms.
Technological renewal must also address public interest and social cohesion. Innovation in medicine, education, and infrastructure—sectors often neglected because they offer lower short-term returns—is essential to long-term stability and democratic legitimacy. Well-designed public–private partnerships can ensure that technological progress delivers broad societal benefits rather than deepening inequality or institutional decay.
Historically, the United States has succeeded in such moments of recalibration. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal stabilized the economy and produced enduring institutions like the TVA and WPA, while Ronald Reagan’s response to stagflation reinvigorated competitiveness and defense technology. Both cases demonstrate that when ideology is adjusted to circumstance, the state, the market, and society can be aligned toward shared, long-term objectives. A renewed technological strategy today demands a similar shift—from disruption and consumer convenience toward resilience, sovereignty, and civilizational purpose.
Policy and Economic Instruments for Technological Renewal
Translating a renewed technological vision into reality requires a coherent set of policy and economic instruments rather than isolated initiatives. Industrial policy must once again become a central tool of statecraft, targeting strategically vital sectors such as advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence compute infrastructure, battery supply chains, and secure telecommunications, including Open RAN architectures. Beyond headline investments, policymakers must address ecosystem bottlenecks—critical materials, advanced packaging, and persistent talent shortages. Sector-specific strategies, akin in ambition to the Works Progress Administration or the Strategic Defense Initiative, can provide the scale and coordination necessary to rebuild these capabilities.
Government procurement is an equally powerful but underutilized lever. Federal purchasing power can serve as anchor demand for secure, domestically produced technologies, reducing market uncertainty and accelerating adoption. By establishing clear standards—such as “Made Secure in America” requirements for cloud services, AI systems, and unmanned platforms—the government can shape markets toward security, reliability, and domestic resilience without direct ownership or control.
Fiscal and financial policy must also be realigned to counter short-termism. Tax incentives should discourage excessive stock buybacks and instead reward sustained investment in research and development, particularly when tied to domestic intellectual property retention and job creation. At the same time, greater scrutiny of venture capital flows into speculative or sensitive dual-use technologies is warranted, including disclosure requirements for foreign influence and capital sources, to protect strategic assets without stifling innovation.
Corporate governance reforms can further reinforce long-term alignment. Dual-class share structures, when paired with explicit public-interest fiduciary duties, may allow firms to pursue long-horizon technological goals insulated from short-term market pressures. This approach seeks to balance shareholder returns with broader national and societal objectives, recognizing that strategic technologies cannot be governed solely by quarterly earnings logic.
Finally, universities and talent pipelines must be treated as core components of technological strategy. STEM education should integrate ethics, systems thinking, and national strategy alongside technical training. New institutional pathways—such as a civilian technology corps that rotates talent among national laboratories, defense agencies, and private firms—can strengthen knowledge transfer and public-service norms. Reframing engineering as a form of civic contribution, rather than purely personal advancement, is essential to sustaining a mission-oriented technological ecosystem over the long term.
Cultural and Institutional Foundations of Technological Renewal
A durable technological revival cannot rest on policy instruments alone; it requires a deeper process of cultural and institutional renewal. At the center of this effort lies the need to rebuild the implicit covenant that once bound talent, capital, and national purpose. During the Cold War, technological progress in the United States was sustained not merely by funding or competition, but by a shared understanding that innovation served the survival and flourishing of a democratic society.
This renewal begins with a transformation of the national narrative around technology. The language of “disruption,” speed, and frictionless scaling must give way to concepts such as resilience, durability, and sovereignty. Technology should no longer be framed primarily as a tool for consumer convenience or market dominance, but as strategic infrastructure essential to democratic continuity and institutional strength.
Institutionally, this shift requires the creation of meaningful public-service pathways for engineers and technologists. National service programs, rotational fellowships, and civilian technology corps can help cultivate a civic identity among technical elites, anchoring innovation in public purpose rather than individual advancement alone. Such structures reinforce the idea that technical expertise carries obligations as well as opportunities.
Finally, cultural renewal demands the explicit reassertion of moral purpose in technological development. Democracies not only have the right but the responsibility to shape technology in ways that support their values, security, and long-term survival. Cold War–era Silicon Valley succeeded because engineers internalized this responsibility within a democratic framework. Restoring that ethos—without resorting to authoritarian control—is the central cultural challenge of technological renewal today.
Historical Parallels and the Logic of National Renewal
Periods of American renewal have rarely emerged from continuity or consensus; they have instead followed moments of crisis that forced a reassessment of dominant orthodoxies. Historical precedent shows that when existing ideological frameworks fail to meet national challenges, effective leadership has responded by realigning state power, markets, and civic purpose rather than retreating into doctrinal comfort. The experiences of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan illustrate how such recalibration can occur within a liberal democratic system.
In the aftermath of the 1929 financial collapse, Franklin D. Roosevelt rejected laissez-faire assumptions that markets alone could stabilize society. Through the New Deal, he constructed durable institutions such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Securities and Exchange Commission, restoring public trust in collective action and democratic governance. By mobilizing state resources to address systemic failure, Roosevelt demonstrated that institutional innovation could reinforce, rather than undermine, liberal capitalism during periods of extreme stress.
A similar pattern emerged following the stagflation of the 1970s. Ronald Reagan is often associated with deregulation and tax reform, yet his presidency also preserved and expanded strategic state investment in defense and technology. Programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative and sustained support for the semiconductor industry maintained Cold War technological momentum while remaining consistent with a market-oriented political framework. Reagan’s approach showed that ideological pivots need not abandon liberal principles to be effective.
The central lesson of these historical parallels is that renewal is inherently disruptive to settled beliefs. It does not arise from consensus or incrementalism, but from the willingness to privilege national purpose over ideological certainty. By drawing on historical experience, the United States can once again align state capacity, market dynamism, and civic action toward long-term goals, demonstrating that democratic societies are capable of strategic adaptation in moments of profound challenge.
The Anticipated Outcomes of Technological Renewal
A successful technological revival would first and foremost restore national autonomy in critical domains such as artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductors, and essential digital and physical infrastructure. Reestablishing control over these foundational technologies would reduce strategic vulnerabilities, secure supply chains, and ensure that core capabilities remain aligned with democratic governance and national priorities rather than external dependence.
Equally important, such a revival would realign economic incentives with long-term public interests. Investment decisions, corporate strategies, and capital flows would increasingly reflect national security considerations, social stability, and collective resilience, rather than short-term financial returns alone. This alignment would correct structural distortions that have historically diverted talent and capital away from strategically vital but less immediately profitable sectors.
Over time, this shift would mitigate the emergence of “innovation deserts” in areas such as defense, energy, infrastructure, and public-interest technologies. By reintroducing mission-driven demand and sustained public–private coordination, these sectors could once again attract high-quality research, talent, and entrepreneurial activity.
Ultimately, the revival would culminate in the reconstitution of a genuine technological republic—one in which engineers and technologists are not merely market actors, but custodians of civilizational resilience. In this model, technological power is exercised with a clear sense of responsibility to democratic institutions, societal continuity, and the long-term survival of the political order itself.
Summary & Implications
Reviving a Cold War–era culture of strategic technological stewardship in the United States is feasible, but only under demanding conditions. Such a renewal requires a conscious rejection of post–Cold War complacency, the rehabilitation of the state’s legitimacy as a strategic actor, the restoration of moral purpose to engineering, and a clear-eyed understanding of China as a warning rather than a model. As Alexander C. Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska emphasize, this project is not an exercise in nostalgia but a conditional choice shaped by political will.
History suggests that such recalibration is possible. Just as Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to the Great Depression and Ronald Reagan confronted the crisis of the 1970s by realigning ideology, institutions, and national purpose, the United States today can reclaim a technological republic through deliberate political, economic, cultural, and institutional action. The alternative is not managed decline but strategic irrelevance. Revival remains within reach—but only if the nation decisively breaks with post–Cold War doctrines and rebuilds a shared sense of technological mission.
References
- The Technological Republic Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West. Alexander C. Karp, Nicholas W. Zamiska. 2025