Ren Zhengfei’s March 2023 speech, “Lighting the Spark, Creating the Future Together,” delivered at Huawei’s “Challenge the Problem” Spark Award Symposium, functions as a highly condensed strategic manifesto on how a technology company—and by extension a nation—can achieve breakthrough under sustained systemic pressure. The speech demonstrates a clear-eyed recognition of existing gaps, a disciplined reliance on long-term institutional strengths such as infrastructure mobilization and strategic planning, and a deliberate emphasis on organizational resilience, cognitive restructuring, and institutional adaptation. Without invoking geopolitical rivalry explicitly, Ren articulated a pragmatic response framework grounded in realism rather than rhetoric.
Implicitly, the speech offers a reinterpretation of the so-called “China model”: not one in which the state supplants the market, but one in which it enables it. The state’s role is framed as the provider of foundational public goods—energy systems, communications networks, and data infrastructure—while enterprises assume responsibility for problem identification, solution orchestration, and closed-loop value creation, and universities retain academic autonomy and ownership of research outcomes. This configuration reflects a governance logic of “strong foundations, light intervention; platform-building rather than control,” paired with a dual-track strategy that safeguards bottom-line security while sustaining openness to global cooperation in areas such as climate change and public health. Together, these elements constitute a coherent and forward-looking paradigm for navigating technological competition through open innovation anchored in institutional resilience.
Facing the Gaps with Resolve: Ren Zhengfei on Institutional Strength, Technological Self-Reliance, and Open Cooperation
In his March 2023 speech “Lighting the Spark, Creating the Future Together” at the Spark Award Symposium, Ren Zhengfei offered a sober yet forward-looking assessment of Huawei’s position amid profound technological and geopolitical pressures. He acknowledged that Huawei remains in a difficult period, but emphasized that the company has not stalled. On the contrary, sustained and rising investment in research and development, large-scale component and circuit board replacement, and the full self-development and deployment of the MetaERP system reflect a strategic determination to survive pressure through long-term capability building rather than short-term expediency.
Ren addressed China-US competition with unusual frankness. He described himself as historically “pro-American,” having once championed the use of the world’s best components and learned deeply from the United States’ scientific culture and innovation ecosystem. Even under sanctions, he stressed that he is not anti-American, recognizing that U.S. leadership in science, education, and soft power remains formidable. Yet external constraints forced Huawei to confront a fundamental vulnerability: dependence on others at critical technological peaks. The response, in his view, was not complaint but reorientation—redirecting accumulated basic research from abstract heights toward concrete engineering breakthroughs that could anchor self-reliance.
On artificial intelligence, Ren rejected hype in favor of structural judgment. He argued that the direct societal contribution of AI software platforms is relatively limited, while their overwhelming value lies in empowering the real economy—manufacturing, energy, transportation, and agriculture. This, he noted, depends less on standalone applications and more on underlying “pipelines” such as computing power, networks, and cloud infrastructure. Huawei’s strategic choice is therefore to cultivate the “black soil” of foundational platforms rather than compete for application-level dominance, remaining open to diverse AI models that will inevitably emerge.
Ren also articulated a clear philosophy on basic research and education. He drew a firm distinction between science, driven by curiosity and open-ended exploration, and technology, driven by problem-solving and real-world constraints. He criticized overly utilitarian education systems that prioritize short-term results over methodology and imagination, arguing that genuine breakthroughs require tolerance for uncertainty and intellectual freedom. In talent cultivation, he emphasized the complementary roles of senior experts, who provide architectural vision, and younger researchers, who bring disruptive ideas and execution power.
This philosophy extends into Huawei’s model of industry-academia-research collaboration. Through open platforms such as the “Huang Danian Tea House” and more closed know-how networks, Huawei positions itself as a facilitator rather than a monopolist of knowledge. Universities are encouraged to pursue independent research using real industrial problems and anonymized data, with full freedom to publish results. Huawei focuses on absorbing outcomes into products and services, reinforcing Ren’s assertion that science transcends borders even when industries face fragmentation.
Underlying the entire speech was a confidence in institutional advantages as a means to offset acknowledged shortcomings. Ren pointed to China’s capacity for long-term planning and large-scale infrastructure mobilization—such as nationwide computing and energy networks—as a foundation that market-driven systems struggle to replicate. Initiatives like digital simulation laboratories exemplify how systemic coordination can accelerate iteration and compensate for constraints in specific technologies. Yet this confidence was not inward-looking; Ren consistently framed openness, cooperation, and talent mobility as essential to turning individual sparks into collective fire.
Ren placed his hopes on the next generation. He described young scientists as the most creative force, often solitary and misunderstood, yet indispensable to progress. By allowing diversity of pace and thought, and by providing platforms that transform isolated brilliance into shared capability, he argued that both Huawei and society can confront their gaps honestly—leveraging institutional strength while remaining open to collaboration in shaping the future.
Recognizing the Gap with Strategic Clarity: A Guardrail Against Misjudgment and Rash Confrontation
Ren Zhengfei’s repeated acknowledgment of the enduring strength of the United States in science and education reflects not an inferiority complex, but a disciplined form of strategic clarity. By recognizing that America’s innovative ecosystem—cultivated over centuries—cannot be replicated or eroded in a short time frame, he rejects emotional or ideological interpretations of external pressure. This perspective reframes technological suppression not as evidence of an opponent’s decline, nor as proof of imminent overtaking, but as a stress test that exposes internal vulnerabilities and demands sober self-assessment.
Central to this logic is a careful distinction between technology blockade and scientific openness. Ren emphasizes that while engineering, manufacturing, and applied technologies are bounded by national interests and policy controls, scientific theory and basic research remain inherently open and borderless. This distinction resists the false conclusion that technological containment equals scientific isolation. It also underpins his opposition to a closed-door approach to “independent innovation,” which risks conflating political resolve with engineering feasibility. Instead, he argues for sustained and expanded cooperation with universities and research institutions, both domestic and international, as the true foundation of long-term innovation capacity.
This stance carries broader implications for US–China technological competition. For China, it serves as a safeguard against technological nationalism—against the temptation to replace technical realism with slogans of self-sufficiency that ignore complex dependencies. For the United States, it offers a warning against exaggerating China’s near-term substitution capabilities, a misjudgment that could lead to indiscriminate sanctions, accelerate technological fragmentation, and ultimately weaken the openness that sustains its own innovation ecosystem.
Taken together, this framework leaves room for a rational mode of competition that is firm without being reckless. In areas where decoupling is unavoidable, targeted contingency planning is necessary. In domains where decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable—such as basic science, climate modeling, and public health research—continued collaboration remains a shared interest. Acknowledging the gap, in this sense, is not an admission of weakness, but a prerequisite for avoiding strategic miscalculation and unnecessary adversity on both sides.
From Institutional Advantage to National Engineering Capability
Rather than replicating a traditional planned economy, China has increasingly leveraged its institutional advantages to compensate for structural weaknesses by building what can be described as “national engineering capabilities.” Ren Zhengfei has repeatedly emphasized that the distinctive strength of the Chinese system lies not in administrative command over firms, but in its capacity for long-term investment, large-scale system integration, and coordinated infrastructure mobilization. These features allow the state to treat certain foundational technologies—such as computing power, data infrastructure, and industrial platforms—as quasi–public goods, enabling comprehensive, non-profit-oriented deployment that underpins advanced applications in artificial intelligence, industrial simulation, and complex system design.
The “Eastern Data, Western Computing” initiative illustrates this logic. Unlike the United States, where privately owned firms allocate resources primarily based on short-term profitability, China can construct nationwide computing infrastructure as a strategic substrate. This creates the conditions for large-scale AI training, model fine-tuning, and industrial “digital wind tunnels,” such as those envisioned in Huawei’s system simulation laboratories. The goal is not central planning of outputs, but the provision of shared engineering foundations that lower systemic costs and accelerate experimentation across industries.
A similar institutional capacity is evident in Huawei’s rapid localization of its supply chain. The replacement of more than 13,000 components and the redesign of over 4,000 circuit boards within three years required more than firm-level resilience. It depended on cross-enterprise coordination, regional resource reallocation, financial support, and standardized national processes. Markets alone would have struggled to deliver this speed and scale; coordinated engineering mobilization made it possible to stabilize complex hardware systems under external constraints.
Crucially, this approach is reinforced by a “triple helix” collaboration among universities, enterprises, and government. The state does not micromanage research but supplies platforms, data, and real-world scenarios—such as automated ports or smart steel plants. Enterprises pose concrete engineering problems, while universities pursue open-ended theoretical and technical solutions. Knowledge remains with scholars, commercialization with firms. The result is a scenario-driven competitive advantage embedded in infrastructure-defined technologies—ranging from advanced communications and energy systems to smart logistics—where progress is cumulative and systemic rather than dependent on isolated breakthroughs.
In the context of US–China competition, this model contrasts sharply with recent American industrial policies such as the CHIPS and IRA Acts. While these initiatives move in a similar direction by combining subsidies with domestic capacity building, they face constraints from short political cycles, fragmented regional interests, and high capital-return pressures. The deeper divergence lies in institutional time horizons: China’s system rewards sustained engineering careers and long-term coordination, allowing it to convert institutional advantages into durable national engineering capabilities rather than episodic industrial interventions.
Open Interfaces as Strategic Confidence in a Fragmenting Technological World
Ren Zhengfei’s most forward-looking strategic judgment is not simply about corporate survival under pressure, but about civilizational self-confidence in an era of technological rivalry. His assertion that Huawei should “learn from the United States in openness and inclusiveness,” and that “science knows no borders,” reframes openness not as a concession, but as a mark of strength. In this view, the willingness to share, collaborate, and remain permeable to global knowledge flows reflects confidence in one’s own intellectual foundations and long-term capacity for innovation.
At the corporate level, Huawei’s actions embody this logic. By open-sourcing parts of MetaERP, opening its Tea House theoretical research platform, and allowing universities to freely publish research derived from its work, Huawei treats openness itself as a core competitive asset. These measures proactively establish credibility and trust, positioning the company within a transparent and verifiable technological ecosystem rather than allowing it to be caricatured as a closed or opaque actor. Openness here functions not defensively, but as a deliberate strategy to build durable legitimacy in global science and engineering communities.
Beyond the firm, Huawei’s participation in non-security-sensitive global cooperation networks further reinforces this stance. Engagements such as collaboration with the ICPC to train young programmers, the establishment of a mathematics institute in France, and the creation of a Spanish-language technology center in Mexico embed Chinese technological actors within international knowledge infrastructures. These initiatives do more than attract talent; they signal a commitment to being a constructive participant in shared intellectual endeavors, especially to technologically neutral regions such as Europe and ASEAN, which value reliability and openness over zero-sum competition.
At a broader systemic level, maintaining open interfaces preserves space for cooperation on global public goods—climate modeling, infectious disease early warning, and polar scientific research—where interests still overlap even amid strategic rivalry. This approach helps prevent technological competition from hardening into a “digital iron curtain” that would dramatically raise the cost of global innovation. As Ren Zhengfei has observed, external pressure may stimulate domestic basic research reserves, but if any major power abandons openness altogether, it risks severing itself from the world’s deepest sources of scientific creativity. In this sense, openness is not merely a tactic; it is an expression of confidence in one’s civilization, institutions, and capacity to learn from the world while contributing meaningfully to it.
Final Thoughts
Ren Zhengfei’s 2023 speech, “Lighting the Spark, Creating the Future Together,” articulates a paradigm of “resilient modernity” that charts a third path between Western free-market fundamentalism and rigid planned economies. Huawei’s approach integrates bottom-line security through national mobilization and supply-chain fortification, cutting-edge innovation through an open and globally collaborative ecosystem, and large-scale transformation through market-driven, enterprise-led mechanisms. This synthesis of institutional flexibility, technological pragmatism, and civilizational openness reflects a strategic orientation that prioritizes sustainability under pressure rather than the singular pursuit of overtaking a rival.
In the context of protracted China–US competition, Ren’s composure underscores a deeper contest over systemic resilience amid uncertainty. Neither denying the pain of external blockades nor succumbing to pessimism, he frames constraint as a catalyst for renewal and long-term iteration. Huawei’s experience suggests that the decisive advantage lies not in quick victories, but in cultivating an innovation ecosystem capable of continuous circulation and regeneration even when external support is disrupted—thereby contributing to the shaping of the rules and values of the next technological civilization.
References
- “Lighting the Spark, Creating the Future Together”, Ren Zhengfei’s Speech at the ‘Challenge the Problem’ Spark Award Symposium. March 2023