Debates over whether China’s development path is historically aberrant often overlook a well-documented pattern of late industrialization. As Ha-Joon Chang argues in Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism (2007), China’s strategies—state intervention, selective protectionism, subsidies, and the copying or weak protection of foreign technologies—closely mirror those once employed by today’s rich nations. From this perspective, China is not an exception but a contemporary example of a long-standing developmental trajectory that successful industrializers have repeatedly followed.
Chang’s analysis further highlights what he terms “kicking away the ladder,” with the United States serving as a prominent case. Having relied heavily on protectionist policies, government support, and lax intellectual property enforcement during its own nineteenth-century rise, the U.S. now champions strict free trade and robust IP regimes for developing countries. This apparent double standard has fueled accusations of hypocrisy in academic, media, and diplomatic debates, particularly amid U.S.–China trade tensions, even as defenders of current policies point to differences in scale, methods, and the modern global economic context.
Imitation Before Innovation: How Today’s Rich Nations Rose Through Weak Intellectual Property Regimes
The historical record surveyed by Ha-Joon Chang in Bad Samaritans reveals a pattern that sharply contrasts with contemporary policy prescriptions. Far from adhering to strict intellectual property protection during their formative stages, today’s advanced economies systematically relied on imitation, borrowing, and lax enforcement of foreign technologies as central tools of industrialization. These practices were not marginal or accidental; they were foundational to national development strategies during periods of technological catch-up.
The United States in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries offers a clear illustration. American industrialization began with the deliberate transfer of British textile technology, most famously through figures such as Samuel Slater and Francis Cabot Lowell, who recreated British machinery and factory systems without authorization. This behavior was facilitated by a patent regime that favored domestic users while offering weak protection to foreign inventors. As a result, American firms could legally exploit imported knowledge, accelerating industrial growth while postponing stringent intellectual property enforcement until domestic capabilities had matured.
Germany followed a similar trajectory in the nineteenth century. During its catch-up phase, German firms extensively copied British manufactured goods, including machinery, tools, and consumer products. Reverse engineering was especially prominent in chemicals and electrical equipment, sectors that later became pillars of German technological leadership. British attempts to stigmatize German imitation through mandatory “Made in Germany” labeling ultimately failed, as German industry used this learning phase to improve quality and competitiveness. What began as imitation evolved into innovation only after domestic capabilities were firmly established.
East Asia’s late industrializers replicated this pattern in the twentieth century. Japan’s Meiji-era modernization depended heavily on absorbing Western technologies through imported machinery, copied designs, and weak enforcement of foreign patents. In the postwar period, Japanese firms initially imitated American and European consumer electronics, refining them incrementally before emerging as global innovators. Stronger intellectual property protection followed, rather than preceded, Japan’s rise to the technological frontier.
South Korea and Taiwan represent even more explicit cases of state-tolerated imitation. During the rapid industrialization of the 1960s to 1980s, Korean conglomerates relied extensively on reverse engineering in heavy industry, shipbuilding, and electronics, while trademark infringement and media piracy were widespread. Taiwan similarly advanced through original equipment manufacturing and institutionalized technology transfer, with public research bodies absorbing foreign know-how and disseminating it to domestic firms. In both economies, intellectual property enforcement remained weak until firms had accumulated sufficient technological competence to compete globally.
Britain itself exemplifies the dynamic reversal at the heart of Chang’s argument. In its early development, Britain benefited from foreign ideas, imported skills, and open knowledge flows. Once it achieved industrial dominance, however, it criminalized technology outflows and restricted skilled worker emigration, effectively “kicking away the ladder” it had used to climb. This shift foreshadowed the modern insistence by advanced economies on strict global intellectual property rules.
Taken together, these cases undermine the notion that strong intellectual property protection is a prerequisite for development. Instead, they demonstrate that technological absorption, imitation, and flexible legal regimes were standard instruments in the ascent of now-rich countries. Only after achieving technological leadership did these nations adopt and promote stringent intellectual property standards, recasting historically contingent strategies as universal best practices.
Questioning the U.S.: Trade and Intellectual Property Double Standards with China
Ha-Joon Chang’s analysis in Bad Samaritans frames the United States as a prime example of historical “ladder-kicking”: a nation that industrialized through protectionism, subsidies, industrial espionage, and lax enforcement of foreign intellectual property, only to later demand strict free trade and robust IP protection from developing countries. Critics of contemporary U.S. policy argue that this pattern is evident in its relations with China. The U.S. frequently condemns Chinese practices—such as alleged IP theft, forced technology transfer, and state-supported industrial promotion—while historically employing similar strategies to achieve its own industrial ascent. This perceived hypocrisy has fueled debates across academia, media, and diplomatic channels, particularly during periods of heightened U.S.-China trade tensions.
Historical parallels are striking. In the nineteenth century, the United States refused to protect foreign copyrights until 1891 and actively encouraged the copying of British technology, exemplified by Samuel Slater’s smuggling of textile designs and Francis Cabot Lowell’s replication of the power loom. Critics point out that these utilitarian policies mirror, in purpose if not scale, China’s early-stage approach to technological catch-up. China has since significantly strengthened its IP regime, leading global patent filings and implementing reforms after joining the WTO in 2001. Nevertheless, U.S. enforcement measures, including Section 301 tariffs and high-profile IP litigation, are often viewed as disproportionately punitive in light of historical precedents.
Trade protectionism further highlights the double standard. The U.S. historically shielded emerging industries with high tariffs averaging 35–50 percent, extensive subsidies, and land grants, yet now criticizes China for similar policies under initiatives like “Made in China 2025.” Beijing and other observers note that the U.S. continues to support domestic sectors through agriculture and technology subsidies while imposing unilateral tariffs, fueling the perception of selective enforcement and economic hegemony. Defenders of U.S. policy argue that the modern context differs: China is now a global economic power, state-led cyber theft poses new risks, and contemporary disputes involve violations of binding WTO and TRIPS agreements rather than the pre-globalized norms that governed nineteenth-century America.
Overall, these critiques underscore a persistent tension: U.S. advocacy for strict trade and IP rules is often juxtaposed against its historical industrial practices. While defenders stress differences in scale, methods, and obligations, the broader narrative remains clear—many perceive an enduring pattern of double standards in U.S. trade and intellectual property relations with China, revealing both historical ironies and contemporary strategic dilemmas.
The Core Parallel: How Late Developers Learn by Copying Before Innovating
Throughout history, nations that industrialized late have followed a strikingly similar path: learning by imitation before leading in innovation. China today exemplifies this trajectory, mirroring the strategies once employed by the U.S., Germany, Japan, and South Korea. In 19th-century America, entrepreneurs replicated British machinery to catch up; Germany counterfeited foreign goods; Japan reverse-engineered Western products; and South Korea openly pirated software and electronics. Each case illustrates a common principle: without understanding the frontier, a country cannot innovate at it.
China has followed this historical pattern through reverse-engineering foreign technologies, leveraging joint ventures and technology transfers to absorb knowledge, and selectively enforcing intellectual property rules while domestic firms remained relatively weak. Far from being an anomaly or deviation, this approach is part of capitalism’s enduring history. Copying is not merely imitation—it is the essential entry point for nations striving to reach the technological frontier. Only by standing on the shoulders of established innovators can late developers begin to innovate themselves.
The Double Standard of Development: “We Copied, Now You Mustn’t”
Throughout history, today’s wealthy nations followed a clear pattern: they climbed to technological and economic leadership through imitation, strategic copying, and selective adoption of foreign innovations. When these countries were in the process of catching up, they tolerated weak or nonexistent intellectual property laws, treated lax enforcement as a practical advantage, and encouraged domestic firms to learn from foreign technology. Policies now considered controversial—such as state support for infant industries, subsidies, or targeted industrial strategy—were then embraced as necessary tools for development.
Yet, once they achieved technological dominance and prosperity, the rules suddenly changed. Strong intellectual property protection became sacrosanct, imitation was recast as theft, and technology transfer from leading to emerging nations was condemned. Practices once admired, such as attracting skilled labor from abroad or selectively borrowing foreign innovations, were now framed as “industrial espionage” or illegitimate. In effect, the very strategies that had propelled them to the top were forbidden for others.
This stark reversal has been aptly described by economist Ha-Joon Chang as “kicking away the ladder.” By enshrining strict IP laws and denouncing developmental interventions, advanced economies effectively deny rising nations the tools they themselves once relied on. The hypocrisy is clear: the path to prosperity that was open, flexible, and often permissive when they were developing is now rigidly closed to others. The message is unmistakable: “We copied to succeed, but you must not.”
China’s Industrial Rise Followed Stricter Legal Norms Than Historical Precedents
China’s approach to technological development has, in many ways, adhered more closely to legal and international norms than historical cases of industrialization in Western countries. Since joining the World Trade Organization, China has committed to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) framework, established formal patent courts, and gradually strengthened IP enforcement as its domestic firms matured. These measures reflect a systematic, rule-bound strategy for technology absorption.
By contrast, many early industrializers in the West pursued far less regulated paths. The United States, for example, effectively legalized foreign patent infringement during the 19th century. Switzerland did not recognize chemical patents until 1978, and the Netherlands abolished patents entirely for more than four decades. Compared to these historical examples, China’s industrialization was conducted under far stricter global rules, demonstrating a more legal and structured approach to technological advancement than previous late developers.
The Rising Scrutiny of China: Speed, Scale, and Strategic Ambition
The global attention on China is not primarily about intellectual property or copying technologies—it is about the scale and speed at which the country is advancing. China’s growth and ambitions have triggered concern because it is large enough to challenge established powers, coordinated enough to act strategically, and increasingly unwilling to remain in low-value manufacturing sectors. Unlike historical cases, where imitation was largely tolerated, China’s trajectory directly reshapes global economic and technological hierarchies.
Historical parallels illustrate why China faces sharper scrutiny. When Germany copied Britain, Britain maintained its dominant position. When South Korea followed the United States, it was a relatively small player. By contrast, when China adopts and adapts foreign innovations, it has the potential to fundamentally alter the balance of power. What might once have been regarded as normal competitive behavior is now framed as a significant moral and strategic challenge, reflecting the extraordinary implications of China’s rise.
The Inevitable Arc: From Imitation to Enforcement in Global Innovation
History reveals a recurring trajectory for nations striving to ascend the technological ladder: an inevitable shift from imitator to enforcer. The process begins with an imitation phase, in which countries absorb foreign technologies, followed by a catch-up phase, where these technologies are improved and adapted. This leads to an innovation phase, during which indigenous champions emerge, culminating in an enforcement phase, where strong intellectual property protections are demanded and vigorously defended.
This pattern has unfolded repeatedly in East Asia. Japan experienced it after the 1970s, South Korea after the 1990s, and Taiwan similarly charted this path. China is now following the same arc. Domestic firms increasingly innovate and defend their patents aggressively, signaling the country’s transition toward the final enforcement stage. The trajectory underscores a predictable, almost unavoidable evolution: nations that once borrowed technology eventually assert their rights, shaping global norms around innovation and intellectual property.
The Uncomfortable Truth Rich Nations Refuse to Acknowledge
The uncomfortable truth that rich nations consistently avoid is that their prosperity was rarely built on principle. Much of the wealth and development they now enjoy was historically accumulated through practices they would today condemn. Yet, in international discourse, these nations cloak their economic self-interest in moral language, framing their past and present policies as matters of principle rather than power.
Intellectual honesty would require acknowledging that strong intellectual property regimes, which they now tout as essential for innovation, historically emerged after a nation had already industrialized and developed. These rules were not the engines of progress but tools to maintain advantage once it had been achieved. In essence, what they are really signaling is: “We broke the rules when it served us—but now that we are ahead, the rules are inviolable.” This is not a defense of principle; it is a protection of power. By ignoring this reality, rich nations perpetuate a moral narrative that shields their self-interest under the guise of global fairness.
Summary & Implications
The ongoing U.S.-China friction over intellectual property highlights a deeper, uncomfortable reality: the rules being enforced today were often flouted by today’s rich nations during their own development. While the U.S. criticizes China for weak enforcement, bad-faith trademarks, and online piracy, China counters with measures to protect itself from “discriminatory” foreign policies and emphasizes its substantial IP achievements, including leading patent filings. As Ha-Joon Chang observes, the historical record reveals a pattern of rich nations rewriting the rules to constrain others’ development. China’s path is not an anomaly; what is unusual is the insistence that it adhere to standards that no successful industrializer ever observed at the same stage. If copying were truly illegitimate, most of today’s wealthy nations would never have achieved their prosperity—a hypocrisy that lies at the heart of the current debate.
References
- Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. By Ha-Joon Chang, 2007
- Kicking Away the Ladder: An Unofficial History of Capitalism, Especially in Britain and the United States. By Ha-Joon Chang, 2002