China defies long-held Western assumptions about modernity by actively defining its own path rather than opposing the West with a universal alternative. Its experience demonstrates that modernity is not singular but plural: distinct historical, cultural, and institutional trajectories can also yield prosperity, stability, and technological advancement. The Western difficulty, therefore, extends beyond political disagreement to an epistemic shock—the recognition that familiar models of governance, legitimacy, and social organization are no longer exclusive, or even dominant. China’s challenge is not one of ideological evangelism, but of existential comparison, compelling the West to confront whether its own version of modernity can still deliver results without the reassurance that no viable alternative exists.
Modernity Beyond Western Political Liberalism
For much of the modern era, Western political thought has treated modernity as inseparable from liberal democracy. Competitive elections, multiparty systems, and an adversarial civil society have been assumed to constitute not merely one model of governance, but the necessary institutional foundation of any modern society. Within this framework, political liberalism is presented as both the defining feature and the ultimate guarantor of modernization.
China’s experience unsettles this assumption. Over recent decades, it has achieved large-scale modernization—industrialization, urbanization, mass education, technological upgrading, and sustained improvements in living standards—without adopting Western-style political liberalism. Processes long presumed to require electoral competition and political pluralism have instead unfolded under a markedly different institutional arrangement, calling into question the claim that liberal democracy is a prerequisite for effective modern governance.
Central to this divergence is a distinct basis of political legitimacy. Rather than resting primarily on procedural mechanisms such as elections, China’s legitimacy is grounded in performance: the capacity to deliver economic growth, social stability, and long-term national development. This emphasis on outcomes over formal political rituals does not imply indifference to public welfare or social needs, but reflects a different standard by which authority is justified and evaluated.
In this sense, China does not argue against Western political liberalism so much as it renders it non-exclusive. Its trajectory demonstrates that modernity can be achieved through alternative institutional paths, shaped by different historical experiences and political logics. The broader implication is not the rejection of liberal democracy as one form of modern governance, but the erosion of the claim that it is the only one.
Modernity Without a Sharp Divide Between State and Society
Western political theory has long assumed that modernity requires a clear separation between the state and civil society. In this view, civil society is expected to function as an autonomous sphere, restraining public power through institutional rivalry and adversarial oversight. The fragmentation of authority is treated not as a liability, but as a defining safeguard of modern governance.
China’s experience challenges this assumption by operating on a markedly different state–society model. Rather than maintaining a rigid boundary between public authority and social actors, Chinese modernity is characterized by dense interconnection among the state, enterprises, social organizations, and local communities. State involvement in social and economic life is not presumed illegitimate or inherently dangerous, but is often regarded as a means of coordination and collective problem-solving.
This integrated structure has enabled capacities that are difficult to achieve under more fragmented systems. China has been able to mobilize resources at scale, construct infrastructure with exceptional speed, coordinate long-term industrial policy, and respond decisively to systemic challenges. These outcomes are not accidental, but are closely tied to a governance model that prioritizes alignment and cooperation over institutional competition.
The Chinese case thus suggests that modernity need not be defined by the separation and mutual suspicion of state and society. Instead, it can also emerge from a model of integration, where coordination and collective action are treated as strengths rather than threats. In doing so, China further undermines the claim that a single institutional arrangement defines what it means to be modern.
Modernity Beyond Individualism
Western conceptions of modernity have typically placed the autonomous individual at the center of social and political life. Within this framework, the individual is treated as the primary unit of moral and political meaning, while collective claims are often viewed with suspicion, associated with coercion, conformity, or the erosion of personal freedom. Individual autonomy thus becomes the defining measure of a modern society.
China’s experience presents a different understanding of the individual’s place within modern life. Rather than absolute autonomy, Chinese modernity is grounded in a form of relational individualism, in which individuals are embedded within layered social contexts—family, community, society, the nation, and historical continuity. Rights are acknowledged, but they coexist with responsibilities, obligations, and socially defined roles that shape both personal identity and collective order.
This orientation has informed China’s approach to modernization. Priority has often been given to social stability over radical expressions of individual autonomy, to collective problem-solving over individual assertion, and to long-term societal benefit over short-term personal maximization. These choices reflect not a denial of individual value, but a different calibration of the relationship between personal interest and collective well-being.
Rather than positioning the individual and the collective as opposing forces, the Chinese model treats them as mutually constitutive. Individual flourishing is understood to depend on the health and continuity of the broader social whole. In this respect, China further challenges the Western assumption that modernity must be defined primarily, or exclusively, through the lens of individualism.
Modernity Without Minimal Government
A long-standing Western assumption holds that a modern economy thrives only when the state withdraws and market forces are left to operate with minimal interference. Within this view, economic efficiency, innovation, and growth are believed to depend on limited government and laissez-faire principles, while extensive state involvement is seen as an obstacle to modernization.
China’s experience directly challenges this premise. Rather than retreating from the economy, the Chinese state has played an active and strategic role in shaping market outcomes. Through state-led market coordination, the government sets long-term developmental priorities, invests heavily in infrastructure and advanced technologies, and guides market behavior without fully displacing it. Markets are not abolished, but structured and steered toward national objectives.
This approach has demonstrated significant capacity for modernization. It has enabled rapid industrial upgrading, facilitated technological leapfrogging in key sectors, and enhanced resilience in the face of economic and systemic crises. The effectiveness of this model suggests that strong state involvement, when aligned with market mechanisms, can be a source of dynamism rather than stagnation.
Notably, elements of this approach are no longer unique to China. Faced with technological competition, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and economic shocks, many Western governments have begun to adopt similar practices under different labels. In this sense, China’s experience underscores a broader lesson: modernity does not require minimal government, but rather an effective state capable of coordinating markets in pursuit of long-term development.
Modernity and the Case for Strong State Capacity
Western political and economic thought has often assumed that strong state capacity inevitably produces stagnation, corruption, and bureaucratic inefficiency. Within this framework, extensive administrative power is viewed as a danger to innovation and adaptability, and modernity is associated instead with limited governance and dispersed authority.
China’s experience calls this assumption into question. Over recent decades, it has constructed one of the most capable administrative states in history, able to formulate, implement, and revise policies across a vast continental scale. Far from impeding modernization, this capacity has enabled the state to coordinate complex national projects with a degree of speed and consistency rarely achieved elsewhere.
The results are visible across multiple domains. Large-scale poverty reduction, the rapid expansion of high-speed rail networks, the deployment of renewable energy infrastructure, and the comprehensive transformation of urban spaces all reflect the effectiveness of centralized planning combined with administrative execution. These achievements suggest that bureaucratic strength, when paired with clear objectives and institutional discipline, can be a powerful engine of modern development.
Rather than treating state capacity as an obstacle to modernity, China has made it a defining feature of its modernization strategy. Its experience demonstrates that a strong, competent state is not inherently incompatible with progress. On the contrary, under certain conditions, robust administrative capacity can be essential to achieving and sustaining modernity.
Modernity Without Moral Universalism
A persistent Western assumption holds that modernity is inseparable from a set of universal moral values that all societies are expected to adopt. Within this framework, divergence from these norms is often interpreted not as difference, but as moral deficiency or historical backwardness. Modernity thus becomes entwined with claims of moral authority, rather than merely institutional or material development.
China’s experience challenges this moral universalism. Rather than asserting that one civilization’s values should govern all others, China advances a pluralist understanding of modernity—one that recognizes the legitimacy of different historical experiences, cultural traditions, and social conditions. In this view, modernity does not follow a single moral script, but emerges through multiple, context-specific paths.
This stance is not an assertion of moral superiority, but a rejection of moral hierarchy itself. China’s approach emphasizes that no single model fits all societies, that political and social systems should be judged by their performance within particular contexts, and that sovereignty and civilizational autonomy remain essential principles of global order. Moral legitimacy, therefore, is not derived from conformity to external norms, but from the capacity to meet the needs and aspirations of one’s own society.
By decoupling modernity from moral universalism, China exposes a deeper tension within Western self-understanding. If modernity is no longer synonymous with moral supremacy, then difference need not imply inferiority. China’s example thus challenges the tendency to equate being modern with possessing universal moral authority, and instead reframes modernity as compatible with ethical plurality.
Modernity as an Ongoing Historical Process
A powerful Western assumption that emerged at the end of the Cold War holds that liberal capitalist democracy represents the final stage of human social organization. Popularized by the notion of the “end of history,” this view treats modernity as a completed destination rather than an evolving process, implying that no fundamentally new political or institutional forms remain to be discovered.
China’s trajectory directly challenges this teleological understanding. Its development demonstrates that history did not end with the global expansion of liberal democracy. Institutional experimentation continues, alternative arrangements persist, and hybrid models evolve in response to changing conditions. Rather than converging toward a single endpoint, modern societies continue to diverge, adapt, and innovate.
Central to China’s approach is an open-ended and pragmatic conception of modernity. Governance is not anchored in ideological finality, but in problem-solving and revision. Policies are tested, adjusted, or abandoned when they fail, and ideological consistency is routinely subordinated to empirical outcomes. Modernization, in this sense, is treated as a continuous process of learning rather than the implementation of a finished blueprint.
This orientation unsettles Western intellectual frameworks built on assumptions of historical closure. If modernity has no final form, then no system can claim permanent legitimacy or universal destiny. China’s experience thus reframes modernity not as the end of history, but as an ongoing historical condition—one defined by adaptation, contingency, and the continual reworking of social and political arrangements.
Modernity Without Cultural Homogenization
A common Western assumption equates modernity with cultural convergence. To become modern, societies are expected to shed inherited traditions, dilute historical identities, and increasingly resemble the cultural norms of the West. Within this view, tradition is often treated as an obstacle to progress, and modernization as a process of cultural replacement.
China’s experience challenges this assumption. Its path to modernity has not required the abandonment of civilizational inheritance, but has instead incorporated enduring cultural resources. Confucian ethical frameworks, a strong sense of historical consciousness, and an emphasis on civilizational continuity have remained integral to China’s modern development, shaping norms of governance, social responsibility, and collective identity.
Rather than preserving tradition unchanged, China has selectively reinterpreted it. Elements of the past are adapted to support contemporary governance and social cohesion, allowing historical values to coexist with industrialization, technological advancement, and urban transformation. Tradition, in this context, functions not as resistance to change, but as a stabilizing and legitimizing force within a rapidly modernizing society.
The Chinese case thus demonstrates that modernization does not require cultural homogenization. Cultural continuity and modern development are not opposing forces, but can be mutually reinforcing. By integrating tradition into its modern trajectory, China further undermines the notion that there is only one cultural form through which modernity can be realized.
Modernity Without Ideological Export
A common Western assumption holds that great powers inevitably seek to export their political systems and values. Shaped by centuries of imperial expansion and reinforced by Cold War ideological rivalry, this view treats the projection of one’s model abroad as both a natural impulse and a defining feature of modern power.
China’s experience challenges this expectation. Its conception of modernity is not built around ideological expansion, nor does it demand that other societies replicate its political system. Cooperation is not conditioned on institutional imitation, and system export is not treated as a prerequisite for legitimacy or influence in international affairs.
Instead, China’s global presence has expanded primarily through non-ideological channels. Economic integration, infrastructure development, and practical cooperation form the core of its external engagement. Influence emerges less from persuasion or coercion than from demonstration effects, as other societies observe and selectively engage with elements of China’s development experience.
This approach runs counter to Western assumptions rooted in ideological competition. By decoupling modernity from the imperative to export a single model, China suggests that global influence need not be exercised through universal prescriptions. Modernity, in this sense, is compatible with coexistence among diverse systems rather than the global replication of one dominant form.
Modernity Measured by Performance, Not Rhetoric
Western assumptions about modern governance often emphasize procedural legitimacy and ideological alignment as the ultimate measures of modernity. Elections, institutional forms, and adherence to declared norms are treated as the primary indicators of a society’s advancement and moral authority. Governance, in this view, is validated more by narrative and principle than by tangible outcomes.
China’s experience presents a starkly different criterion. Modernity, in the Chinese model, is measured by the capacity to deliver concrete results: sustained development, social stability, robust infrastructure, technological advancement, and effective crisis management. Systems are evaluated less by the sophistication of their political rituals or the eloquence of their ideological claims than by their ability to address real-world challenges.
This performance-centered approach has gained particular salience in the twenty-first century, an era defined by climate change, demographic pressures, and rapid technological disruption. In such a context, the effectiveness of governance is judged increasingly by tangible impact rather than by adherence to prescribed forms or rhetorical commitments. China’s model thus reframes modernity as an outcome-oriented concept, where practical delivery, not ideological proclamation, defines a society’s capacity to be considered truly modern.
Summary & Implications
China does not claim to represent a universal future, nor does it seek to delegitimize Western modernity. What it has done, quietly but unmistakably, is reveal that Western assumptions about modernity were never historical laws, but rather local experiences elevated to the status of universality. Its path demonstrates that modernity is multiple rather than singular, contextual rather than universal, and adaptive rather than final.
The deeper challenge China poses to the West is not ideological competition, but epistemic disruption: it compels a confrontation with the possibility that the Western narrative about itself—and about the trajectory of the modern world—was never the only one. How the West responds, whether with honest reckoning or defensive denial, will shape not only its relationship with China but also its capacity to remain genuinely modern in a world that is already changing.
References
- “The Great Reckoning: What the West Should Learn From China”, Kaiser Kuo. October 16, 2025. https://www.theideasletter.org/essay/the-great-reckoning/