One of the United States’ most consequential strategic mistakes of the past century may have been its failure to confront Iran at the height of its power. While many argue that the greater error was abandoning the containment of China after 2001 and becoming entangled in the Middle East, this perspective may be incomplete. A different interpretation suggests that China remained the ultimate strategic target, and that U.S. involvement in the Middle East was not merely a distraction but a preparatory maneuver, aimed at securing influence in Eurasia and encircling both China and Russia from the continent’s interior.
I. The Middle East as a Geopolitical Lever Against Eurasia
1. Encircling the Eurasian Heartland: The Strategic Imperative of Iran
By 2008, the United States had established a significant presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, effectively positioning itself to surround Iran. Had Iran fallen, Washington would have gained decisive control over the Persian Gulf and key Middle Eastern energy routes, projecting influence across the region and securing a strategic foothold in Eurasia.
Beyond the Middle East, dominating Iran would have allowed the United States to exert pressure on Russia’s southern flank, threaten China’s northwest approaches, and influence India’s northwestern corridors. Control over these territories, along with the Indian Ocean energy routes, would have completed a land-based encirclement of China and Russia, establishing unparalleled leverage over Eurasia’s heartland and shaping the continent’s strategic balance for decades.
2. The Missed Strategic Window (2008–2016): America’s Opportunity Against Iran
Between 2008 and 2016, the United States held a rare strategic window to confront Iran. During this period, American forces controlled both Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran was diplomatically isolated, and U.S. military power stood at its post–Cold War peak. The convergence of these conditions created a unique opportunity to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East and project influence deeper into Eurasia.
Despite these advantages, the United States did not act against Iran. The most plausible explanation lies in external deterrence: Russia and China, whose strategic positions were already under pressure from U.S. advances, likely exerted influence that restrained direct confrontation. The failure to seize this moment represents a missed chance to consolidate control over the Persian Gulf and complete the broader strategy of encircling the Eurasian heartland.
II. Syria, Ukraine, and the Attempt to Break Russia
1. The Syrian Civil War and Crimea: Russia’s Strategic Resilience
Beginning in 2011, the United States and its allies took steps that contributed to the destabilization of Syria, while the 2014 crisis in Ukraine culminated in Russia’s annexation of Crimea. These events appeared to serve several strategic objectives: denying Russia access to the Mediterranean through Syria, undermining its Black Sea naval presence in Crimea, and isolating Iran by dismantling its regional allies.
Despite these pressures, Russia defied expectations, maintaining control over both Syria and Crimea. By preserving its last forward positions in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, Russia safeguarded critical strategic assets, demonstrating resilience in the face of coordinated international efforts. This outcome highlighted the limits of U.S. influence and the challenges of reshaping Eurasian power dynamics through proxy conflicts and regional interventions.
2. China’s Role: Silent but Strategic
During this period, China refrained from overt military involvement, choosing instead to advance its interests through economic and strategic support. Its engagement with Russia was marked less by arms transfers and more by long-term energy agreements, signaling a careful approach to strengthening alliances without direct confrontation.
This silent yet deliberate strategy allowed China to safeguard its strategic position while avoiding entanglement in regional conflicts. By leveraging economic and diplomatic influence rather than military force, China reinforced Russia’s resilience and ensured that its own long-term objectives in Eurasia remained secure.
III. Why Iran Was the Key to China’s Encirclement
Iran represented the critical linchpin in a broader strategy to contain China. Had the United States occupied Iran, Beijing would have faced both maritime and continental encirclement: naval pressure from Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, alongside territorial constraints through Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Control over Iran’s oil and energy routes would have further strangled China’s access to vital resources, severely limiting its capacity to challenge U.S. power, including in flashpoints like the South China Sea.
The 2016 South China Sea standoff illustrated the consequences of the missed opportunity. China maintained a narrow advantage and successfully deterred U.S. escalation—not because of American weakness, but because Washington had failed to secure Eurasia’s interior. Without control over Iran, the United States could not fully project power across Eurasia, leaving China strategically unencumbered and reinforcing the pivotal role Iran could have played in a comprehensive encirclement strategy.
IV. Trump, Biden, and the Iran Question: Divergent Strategies and Uncertain Outcomes
Under President Trump, U.S. policy appeared increasingly geared toward confronting Iran. Troops were withdrawn from Syria, allies were pressured to increase their contributions, and key international agreements were abandoned, signaling preparation for a potential military conflict. By 2020, the prospect of war with Iran seemed imminent, reflecting an aggressive strategy of coercion and containment.
In contrast, President Biden’s approach introduced a strategic pause. The withdrawal from Afghanistan eased direct pressure on Iran, indicating at least a temporary abandonment of military action. Whether this shift represents a permanent policy change or a calculated strategy of deception remains unclear. Together, these contrasting approaches highlight the uncertainty surrounding U.S. intentions toward Iran and underscore the enduring significance of the country in broader Eurasian strategy.
V. Iran as a Rising Geopolitical Challenger: Expanding Influence and Regional Ambitions
Iran is increasingly asserting itself as a major geopolitical challenger in the Middle East. Through the so-called Shiite Crescent—spanning Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—it has expanded its influence, creating a continuous corridor of power that grants potential access to the Mediterranean and reshapes regional dynamics. This strategy not only strengthens Iran’s position but also challenges American influence and traditional alliances across the Middle East.
Beyond territorial influence, Iran projects a vision of unifying the Islamic world under its leadership. By invoking the cause of Jerusalem, it seeks to bridge sectarian divides, potentially aligning both Sunni and Shia populations. Such a unification would place immense pressure on Gulf monarchies, compelling them to either cooperate or face political destabilization, and could ultimately drive American influence out of the region entirely. Iran’s combination of strategic depth and ideological ambition marks it as a rising and increasingly formidable geopolitical challenger.
VI. The Strategic Deadlock Facing the United States: Trapped Between Iran, China, and Russia
The United States currently faces a complex strategic triangle, where each course of action carries significant risks. Launching a direct attack on Iran could provoke a prolonged quagmire, compounded by covert support for Tehran from Russia and China. Conversely, allowing Iran to expand its influence would steadily erode U.S. power across the Middle East, undermining longstanding alliances and energy security.
A premature confrontation with China or Russia would similarly be fraught, as it would leave Iran free to consolidate its regional dominance, further destabilizing the Middle East and complicating American strategic objectives. In essence, every potential path presents the United States with a form of strategic loss, highlighting the profound deadlock in navigating competing challenges across Eurasia and the Middle East.
VII. The U.S. Aversion to Continental Warfare: Historical Roots and Strategic Consequences
The United States has historically exhibited a deep reluctance to engage in large-scale continental warfare against major land powers. Unlike Britain, which repeatedly committed ground forces to European conflicts, the U.S. has often preferred to rely on allies, technology, and indirect means to achieve strategic objectives. This pattern is evident across multiple conflicts, including Korea and Vietnam, and is rooted in choices made during World War II, when the U.S. allowed the Soviet Union to bear the brunt of the European land war.
Over time, this strategic culture has emphasized avoiding ground defeat over achieving decisive victory. The reliance on proxies and technology reinforced a cautious approach, fostering a long-term hesitation to commit American forces directly in Eurasia. Had the U.S. pursued a more aggressive land strategy—defeating Germany on the continent and capturing Berlin, or invading Japan directly and taking Tokyo—it might have cultivated an enduring perception of invincibility in land warfare. Instead, the reliance on indirect approaches cemented caution as a core component of U.S. military doctrine.
This aversion to continental engagement continues to shape American strategic options today. It complicates potential confrontations with powers such as Iran, Russia, or China, where decisive land campaigns could be necessary. The U.S. preference for avoiding direct land entanglement remains both a strategic strength and a limitation, shaping how it projects power across Eurasia and the broader Middle East.
VIII. Debt, War, and Historical Reality: Financial Constraints Do Not Preclude Strategic Action
Arguments that the United States avoided confronting Iran due to financial limitations are historically unconvincing. Throughout history, great powers have repeatedly waged wars while heavily indebted, recognizing that war debt is a normal feature of military expansion rather than an insurmountable obstacle. Bankruptcy or fiscal strain has rarely prevented nations from pursuing decisive geopolitical objectives.
If the U.S. could expend trillions on domestic programs without undermining its fiscal stability, it is reasonable to ask why similar resources could not have been marshaled to secure a strategic advantage over Iran. Historical precedent suggests that financial constraints alone are insufficient to explain the absence of decisive action; instead, broader strategic, political, and geopolitical factors likely shaped the U.S. approach.
IX. Britain’s Lesson: Small Decisions, Catastrophic Outcomes
Britain’s long-term decline illustrates how seemingly minor strategic choices can trigger far-reaching consequences. The decision to seize Ottoman dreadnoughts, intended as a limited tactical move, pushed the Ottoman Empire into the arms of the Central Powers. This single act set off a chain reaction that contributed to the collapse of Russia, the rise of the Soviet Union, and ultimately the outbreak of World War II.
The reverberations of this early decision extended well into the twentieth century, culminating in Britain’s eventual imperial disintegration. The lesson is clear: great strategic disasters often originate from initial miscalculations that appear insignificant at the time but escalate into profound historical consequences. Britain’s experience serves as a cautionary tale for modern powers weighing the costs and risks of their strategic choices.
X. Conclusion: The Unused Moment of Power
One of the United States’ most consequential strategic errors was its failure to challenge Iran at the height of its power, thereby forfeiting an opportunity to decisively shape the balance of Eurasia. Even an unsuccessful attempt would have been preferable to prolonged hesitation. Instead, the United States now confronts a far more adverse strategic environment, marked by a rising China, a resilient Russia, and an emboldened Iran—each reinforcing the others in ways that constrain American power.
History is rarely kind to great powers that decline through inaction rather than overreach. Strategic windows, once closed, do not reopen on favorable terms. As the old warning reminds us, “If you do not take what Heaven offers, you will suffer the consequences.”