Europe’s disproportionate exposure to the economic, energy, and security costs of the Russo-Ukrainian War was neither accidental nor unseen by European politicians and policy institutions. The central question is therefore not whether the risks were understood, but why they were accepted. A plausible explanation is that European elites did not equate “Europe’s losses” with their own: incentives, time horizons, and power structures allowed decision-makers to tolerate asymmetric costs borne largely by society. This dynamic resembles a large apartment building governed by a homeowners’ association that knowingly accepts a higher fire risk because those making the decision are insulated from the worst consequences, even as the building as a whole becomes more vulnerable.
A Shared Building Beside a Spreading Fire
You live in a large apartment complex made up of many units of different sizes and owners, unequal in value and protection but bound together by the same physical structure. Despite these differences, all residents depend on the building’s collective safety, which no single unit can secure on its own.
When a fire breaks out in an abandoned warehouse next door, it does not immediately touch the complex, yet the wind carries smoke and embers toward it. Whatever disagreements may exist about timing or severity, everyone recognizes one basic reality: if the fire spreads, the entire building will suffer damage. Some apartments may be hit harder than others, but none will escape the consequences, simply because the threat originates next door and the building stands together in its path.
When Knowledge Meets Unequal Stakes: The HOA at Risk
The homeowners’ association convenes an emergency meeting in response to the fire burning next door. Several viable responses are on the table: investing heavily and immediately in firewalls and water systems, coordinating with neighboring buildings to contain the threat, or waiting to see whether the fire extinguishes itself. None of these options are proposed in ignorance. The board has engineers’ assessments, risk models, and forecasts, and all members fully understand the potential danger to the building.
Yet awareness does not translate into shared incentives. The board members are not equally exposed to the consequences of failure. Some own penthouses protected by private insurance, others rent and expect to leave within a year, while still others are developers who might even benefit if the property is later redeveloped. In contrast, ordinary residents—those living on lower floors with no special safeguards—bear the greatest risk if the fire spreads.
This disparity explains why foresight does not guarantee precaution. When critics ask whether the danger was obvious, the answer is unequivocally yes. The decisive factor was not blindness but asymmetry: those empowered to decide did not all face the same costs if the worst outcome materialized.
“The Building’s Loss” versus “My Loss”: When Risk Is Unequally Shared*
A proposal is put forward to construct a massive fire barrier across the apartment complex. The plan promises long-term protection, but it comes with immediate costs: higher HOA fees, temporary reductions in apartment values, and months of disruptive construction. On its face, the project seems a clear way to safeguard the building—but its burdens are unevenly distributed.
One board member quietly calculates his personal exposure. His unit is fully insured, he intends to sell before next year, and the noise and chaos might even justify higher rents elsewhere. For him, the cost of acting now outweighs the personal risk of delay. Publicly, he frames his stance as caution: “We must remain calm. Overreaction could cause panic.” This is not foolishness. It is position-based rationality: the losses the building might suffer are not equivalent to the losses he personally would endure, so in his calculus, postponing action is entirely sensible.
How External Pressure Strengthens Internal Authority
As the fire edges closer, anxiety spreads through the apartment complex, and the homeowners’ association president’s authority unexpectedly solidifies. Residents, fearing imminent damage, rally behind the office of leadership, granting emergency powers, dismissing objections as “irresponsible,” and temporarily suspending normal budgetary rules. The president did not cause the fire, yet the external threat makes him far harder to challenge.
Some board members privately recognize the political calculus: the crisis is dangerous and unwelcome, but it also consolidates power and silences dissent. In this way, external pressure—though originating outside the building—reshapes the internal dynamics, strengthening authority in ways that would have been impossible under ordinary circumstances.
Unequal Exposure, Unequal Urgency
In the apartment complex, the experience of risk is far from uniform. Residents on the lower floors smell smoke every night, acutely aware of the fire threatening the building, while those on the upper floors barely notice its presence. Yet the board making critical decisions is dominated by upper-floor owners, whose personal exposure—and therefore sense of urgency—is far lower.
When lower-floor residents protest, they are reminded that sacrifices are necessary for the building’s long-term safety. But “the building” is an abstraction; the smoke, the heat, and the immediate danger are real, tangible, and concentrated on those least represented in the decision-making process. The result is a disconnect between who feels the danger most and who controls the response, creating decisions that may inadequately address the risks faced by the most vulnerable.
The Role of Outside Firefighters
A powerful private firefighting company arrives with an offer to help—but at a steep price. Their terms are exacting: control over the firefighting strategy, exclusive contracts for future safety systems, and influence over the homeowners’ association’s decisions. While some board members are uneasy with the arrangement, smaller owners lack the leverage to oppose it.
In the face of immediate danger, compliance becomes the rational choice. Refusing the company’s terms would mean confronting the fire alone, a risk no one is willing to take. The situation illustrates how external actors can shape internal governance: when a crisis is imminent, those with expertise and resources can impose conditions that may be suboptimal for the collective, yet unavoidable for individuals seeking protection.
Why Some Members Push Escalation
Within the homeowners’ association, not all board members view the fire purely as a threat. One argues that allowing the blaze to continue for a controlled period could justify a full rebuild of the complex. Such a reconstruction would wipe away old debts, introduce new zoning rules, and enable the development of higher-end apartments.
For this board member, the fire represents a calculated opportunity rather than an unmitigated disaster. While the danger is real and the consequences severe for many residents, some see strategic advantage in escalation, leveraging the crisis to achieve long-term gains that would otherwise be unattainable. This perspective underscores how personal incentives can shape responses to shared risk.
When Residents Say “This Was Avoidable”
Years after the fire has caused damage, residents often look back and declare, “This didn’t have to happen.” On the surface, such statements seem reasonable, suggesting that better choices or earlier action could have prevented the disaster.
Yet this view rests on assumptions that never held: it presumes a single rational actor, aligned incentives across all residents and board members, equal exposure to risk, and consistent long-term thinking. In reality, none of these conditions existed. The complex interplay of unequal stakes, divergent interests, and asymmetric power made coordinated prevention extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, even for those fully aware of the danger.
Final Thoughts: Bringing It Back to Europe (Without Moral Judgment)
The apartment-building analogy helps illuminate the dynamics behind Europe’s response to the Russo-Ukrainian War, without casting blame. Just as residents face unequal exposure to a fire, European societies bear the greatest costs, while decision-makers are differently insulated by power, position, and short-term horizons. Policies and actions are shaped not by ignorance but by asymmetric incentives and the uneven distribution of risk.
External pressures—such as economic shocks, security threats, and international expectations—can strengthen internal authority and shape decisions, just as outside actors influence the HOA’s response to the fire. Individual actors may even see opportunity in crisis, pursuing strategies that serve narrow interests while the collective absorbs broader consequences. Understanding Europe’s choices in this light clarifies how structural factors, rather than simple misjudgment or negligence, produce outcomes where the “building’s loss” differs from the “personal loss” of those making the decisions.