I. Gratitude or Reciprocity? Reframing the Meaning of China’s WTO Accession
At the heart of debates over China’s rise lies a fundamental question: should China’s integration into the global economy be understood in terms of gratitude and patronage, or as the outcome of mutual interest among sovereign actors? The assertion that China “owes” its development to accession to the World Trade Organization rests on an implicit premise—that WTO entry was a unilateral concession bestowed by a benevolent Western hegemon. This framing is not merely descriptive; it carries normative weight, suggesting hierarchy, obligation, and moral indebtedness.
A closer examination challenges this premise. China’s WTO accession was not an act of charity, but a negotiated transaction shaped by reciprocal economic incentives, strategic calculations, and the broader dynamics of globalization. Western economies sought access to China’s vast market, lower production costs, and supply-chain integration, while China pursued export growth, institutional reform, and international legitimacy. Misjudgments about the long-term consequences of this integration may have occurred, but miscalculation is not the same as benevolence, nor does it generate moral claims of gratitude.
Ultimately, trade agreements presuppose reciprocity, not patronage. To recast China’s WTO entry as a favor demanding thankfulness is to obscure the transactional nature of the system itself. Gratitude implies hierarchy; mutual exchange implies equality among participants pursuing their own interests. The real issue, therefore, is not whether China should be grateful, but whether contemporary tensions arise from a retrospective moralization of what was, at the time, a shared bet on mutual gain.
II. WTO Accession: What China Gained — and What the West Gained
1. The Substance of China’s Gains from WTO Accession
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, following fifteen years of arduous negotiations, undeniably accelerated its economic transformation. Membership opened sustained access to major Western consumer markets, embedded Chinese firms into global supply chains, and triggered large inflows of foreign direct investment. These developments supported export expansion, foreign-exchange accumulation, and a wave of institutional and industrial reforms driven by external competitive pressure. In this sense, WTO entry functioned as a powerful catalyst rather than a guaranteed outcome.
Yet these gains were neither automatic nor cost-free. China paid substantial adjustment costs to meet WTO commitments and survive global competition. Inefficient state-owned enterprises were closed or restructured, leading to massive layoffs. Millions of migrant workers endured long hours, harsh conditions, and minimal labor protections, while early export industries operated on thin margins with limited value capture. For years, growth relied on scale, discipline, and endurance rather than wealth or technological sophistication.
Crucially, China did not “get rich overnight” as a result of WTO membership. What it gained was time: time to learn, to upgrade, to accumulate capital and experience within a stable global trading framework. That temporal window—earned through sustained effort and social cost—proved decisive. WTO accession did not bestow prosperity; it created the conditions under which prosperity could eventually be built.
2. The Overlooked Benefits of China’s WTO Integration for the West
Discussions of China’s WTO accession often understate the magnitude of gains accrued by Western economies. The integration of China’s low-cost manufacturing capacity into global markets exerted sustained downward pressure on prices, helping suppress inflation in the United States and Europe for decades; absent this effect, inflationary pressures would likely have emerged much earlier and more forcefully. Multinational corporations captured extraordinary profits by producing at renminbi-denominated costs while selling into dollar-based markets, while consumers benefited from an unprecedented era of affordable goods. At a systemic level, China’s role as the “world’s factory” reinforced the dollar-centered financial order by providing it with a stable industrial anchor. In this sense, China did not merely export manufactured products—it exported price stability, a contribution that proved foundational to Western economic performance but is frequently overlooked.
III. The Strategic Misjudgment of the United States
1. Post–Cold War Confidence and Strategic Misreading
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, US strategic thinking was shaped by a pronounced sense of triumph and historical inevitability. Policymakers widely embraced the belief that economic liberalization would naturally produce a middle class, and that a growing middle class would, in turn, lead to political liberalization. This logic, often associated with the “end of history” thesis, fostered confidence that market integration was not merely economically beneficial but politically transformative.
Within this framework, China was viewed less as a potential challenger than as a transitional case. It was commonly perceived as poor, technologically and militarily backward, and primarily valuable as a large but manageable market. A wealthier China, it was assumed, would become a cooperative stakeholder in the existing international order rather than an independent rival. At the time, China did not rank among Washington’s primary strategic concerns—an assessment that reflected post–Cold War overconfidence more than careful long-term calculation.
2. Perceived Rivals: America’s Strategic Fears in the 1990s
During the 1990s, US strategic attention was directed primarily toward actors seen as immediate or structural challengers to American power, rather than toward China. Japan loomed large as an economic and technological rival, prompting measures aimed at curbing its ascent, including coordinated currency realignment and pressure on key industries such as semiconductors. At the same time, European integration and the emergence of the euro raised concerns about a potential challenge to dollar dominance, reinforcing Washington’s sensitivity to shifts within the transatlantic economic order.
Russia, meanwhile, remained a central security concern due to its inherited nuclear arsenal and military capabilities. US policy focused on managing this residual threat through mechanisms such as NATO’s eastward expansion and broader efforts to reshape the post-Soviet security environment. In this strategic landscape, China appeared comparatively benign—economically useful, politically distant, and militarily underdeveloped. Relative to Japan, the European Union, and Russia, China was viewed less as a rival than as a complementary participant in a US-led global system, a perception that would only later be reassessed.
IV. Calculation, Not Benevolence: Why the United States Supported China’s WTO Entry
The decision by the United States to support China’s accession to the World Trade Organization was driven by strategic calculation rather than generosity. US policymakers largely expected that exposure to global competition would weaken or dismantle China’s state-owned enterprises, while American goods and firms would dominate Chinese markets. Economic integration was also viewed as a catalyst for internal political change, with the assumption that market forces would encourage a gradual process of “peaceful evolution” toward liberal norms.
This logic was articulated openly at the time. President Clinton and other officials framed WTO entry as an instrument to reshape China from within, not as a concession to empower it externally. The prevailing belief was that the United States was managing risk by integrating a weaker economy into a system it controlled—fattening a compliant calf rather than nurturing a future competitor. The strategic surprise lay not in the intent, but in the outcome.
V. China’s Understated Domestic Strengths
Analyses of China’s rise often emphasize external enablers while underplaying the country’s internal advantages, particularly its state capacity and centralized coordination. For global investors, China offered a combination that was rare among large developing economies: policy continuity over long time horizons, relatively reliable contract enforcement, the ability to mobilize national resources, and rapid infrastructure delivery at scale. These features reduced uncertainty and transaction costs, making long-term investment feasible even amid institutional imperfections.
The contrast with other large economies was instructive. In countries such as India, federal fragmentation, uneven state-level governance, protracted judicial processes, and politicized labor relations frequently delayed projects and raised risks. China’s centralized system, by comparison, enabled swift execution and alignment across regions and sectors, reinforcing its attractiveness as a manufacturing and investment hub.
Equally important was China’s labor and education base. Its advantage lay not merely in low wages, but in the organization, scale, and technical depth of its workforce. As famously observed by Tim Cook, while the United States struggled to assemble enough engineers to fill a single room, China could marshal numbers large enough to fill multiple football fields. This capacity for human organization—combining quantity with growing technical competence—proved decisive. China’s success was therefore not just a function of cost, but of coordination, discipline, and institutional capacity that are often underestimated in external accounts.
VI. Why China’s Path Proved Hard to Replicate
India’s experience illustrates why China’s post-WTO trajectory was not easily reproducible, even among large developing economies that integrated into the global trading system earlier. India joined the World Trade Organization before China, yet the economic outcomes diverged sharply. This divergence cannot be explained by claims of Western favoritism toward China, but rather by differences in domestic execution capacity and institutional reliability.
A series of high-profile investment failures underscored these weaknesses. The Enron Dabhol Power Project collapsed amid currency instability, state government default, and contract repudiation. Delta Airlines exited the market after facing domestic price wars and discriminatory policy treatment. Korean power projects encountered collective state-level defaults compounded by judicial paralysis that made dispute resolution slow and uncertain. These episodes eroded investor confidence and highlighted systemic governance constraints.
By contrast, China’s relative success stemmed from its ability to execute commitments consistently, coordinate across levels of government, and enforce contracts with greater predictability. The critical variable was not preferential treatment from the West, but China’s capacity to translate openness into sustained industrial and infrastructural outcomes. WTO membership created opportunities for many; China’s advantage lay in its ability to seize them.
VII. The WTO as Access, Not Alms
The World Trade Organization is often mischaracterized as a mechanism that automatically delivers prosperity to its members. In reality, WTO membership is neither a form of charity nor a guarantee of economic transformation. Many developing and fragile states—ranging from Venezuela and several Central Asian economies to Laos, Liberia, and Afghanistan—have joined the organization without experiencing sustained growth or structural upgrading. Their experiences underscore a simple point: entry into the global trading system, by itself, produces no miracles.
The WTO provides access, not outcomes. It offers a rules-based framework, market entry, and dispute mechanisms, but it does not substitute for domestic discipline, institutional capacity, or strategic coherence. The distinction is analogous to admission to a prestigious university: acceptance opens doors, but success depends on effort, preparation, and execution after entry. China’s trajectory was exceptional not because the WTO was generous, but because China was able to convert access into advantage. The organization set the stage; performance determined the result.
VIII. Historical Contingency and Unplanned Advantages
Beyond strategy and structure, historical contingency played a critical role in reshaping China’s developmental timeline. Two unforeseen events proved especially consequential. The attacks of September 11, 2001 redirected US strategic attention toward the Middle East, effectively granting China a decade of relative breathing room to consolidate growth without sustained geopolitical pressure. Later, the 2008 global financial crisis damaged US economic credibility while positioning China as a source of stability rather than confrontation at a moment of systemic stress.
These developments were neither designed nor anticipated by Chinese policymakers, yet their impact was profound. They altered priorities, delayed strategic rivalry, and reshaped perceptions at critical junctures. China’s rise cannot be explained solely by intention or planning; it was also shaped by exogenous shocks that created unexpected openings. In this sense, contingency—rather than design—provided crucial, if accidental, assistance.
IX. WTO Rules, Developmental History, and the Problem of Selective Moralism
Debates over China’s compliance with WTO rules often assume that contemporary standards of free trade, intellectual property protection, and limited state intervention represent neutral, timeless norms. Ha-Joon Chang’s Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism directly challenges this assumption. His central argument is that today’s advanced economies—most notably Britain and the United States—industrialized by using many of the same tools now criticized in China, and only after achieving economic dominance did they begin to promote free trade and small government as universal prescriptions. The resulting tension between historical practice and modern preaching lies at the core of accusations of hypocrisy.
Protectionism stands at the center of Chang’s thesis. Britain shielded its manufacturing sector for centuries through high tariffs, export bans on advanced machinery, and restrictions on skilled labor emigration. The United States was even more explicit: from the early nineteenth century through World War II, it maintained some of the highest industrial tariffs in the world, often exceeding 40 percent. Figures such as Alexander Hamilton openly advocated infant-industry protection and state support. Free trade became doctrine only after these countries had already secured industrial supremacy. China’s strategy of protecting domestic firms until they reach global competitiveness thus fits a well-established historical pattern rather than a radical departure.
A similar logic applies to intellectual property. During their catch-up phases, neither Britain nor the United States enforced strict IP regimes. Britain freely absorbed foreign technologies, particularly from the Netherlands, while early patent enforcement was weak when it conflicted with national development goals. The United States long refused to recognize foreign patents, allowing domestic firms to copy British machinery and textiles, and permitted widespread piracy of British books through lax copyright laws. Chang’s argument is not that IP protection is inherently harmful, but that strong enforcement historically followed industrial success rather than preceding it. China’s early reliance on imitation, reverse engineering, and technology transfer mirrors this sequence.
State involvement in the economy further undermines the narrative of laissez-faire origins. Britain’s industrial rise was inseparable from state power—naval dominance, colonial markets, infrastructure development, and financial system stabilization all played decisive roles. The United States likewise relied heavily on public land grants, infrastructure investment in canals and railroads, and military procurement to nurture industry. Markets were shaped, not merely unleashed. China’s state-led approach, particularly in strategic sectors, reflects this tradition of developmental capitalism rather than an aberrant model.
Subsidies, preferential treatment, and controlled globalization were also standard tools. Both Britain and the United States actively supported selected industries, tolerated early failures, and opened markets selectively and strategically. Capital flows were regulated, trade liberalization was partial, and full openness came only after domestic firms could withstand competition. Once dominance was achieved, however, these same countries began advocating strict global rules against industrial policy—a move Chang famously describes as “kicking away the ladder.”
This historical context complicates contemporary WTO debates. The organization has never formally ruled China to be broadly “non-compliant,” and rule enforcement has always been political rather than neutral. The United States, for example, has lost more WTO cases than any other member and has frequently ignored unfavorable rulings. Moreover, state-owned enterprises are not unique to China; the US itself operates major federal enterprises such as Amtrak, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Commodity Credit Corporation. The selective framing of Chinese practices as uniquely illegitimate obscures both historical precedent and ongoing realities.
The broader lesson is not that China, Britain, and the United States are identical cases, but that the policies now labeled as distortive or unfair were once normal instruments of development. From Chang’s perspective, modern China resembles a historically typical late industrializer—albeit on an unprecedented scale—operating within a global system whose rules were shaped by those who climbed the ladder earlier. Accusations of hypocrisy arise not from rule-breaking alone, but from the dissonance between history and contemporary moral claims about how development is supposed to occur.
X. The Irony of Success: China’s Ascent up the Value Chain
The central tension in today’s China–West economic relationship is no longer about China’s entry into the World Trade Organization or its participation in global trade. The real issue is that China has moved beyond low-end manufacturing. It is no longer confined to producing socks, furniture, or basic consumer goods; it now competes in semiconductors, 5G infrastructure, electric vehicles, and digital platforms. This shift marks a transition from cost-based participation to capability-based competition.
In this context, the underlying concern is not primarily about rule violations or institutional noncompliance. Rather, it is about successful upgrading. China has begun to challenge incumbents in higher value-added sectors that were once assumed to be securely held by advanced economies. The irony is that the very development trajectory once encouraged—integration, learning, and upgrading—has produced outcomes that now provoke resistance. The conflict, at its core, reflects discomfort with competition from a former peripheral player that has climbed the value chain faster and further than anticipated.
XI. Summary & Implications: Gratitude or Realism? Reassessing the Meaning of China’s Rise
The question of whether China should be “grateful” for its rise through WTO accession ultimately rests on how that history is interpreted. A balanced assessment suggests that China should acknowledge the historical context and the opportunities created by global integration, but it need not accept a master–servant narrative that frames its development as the result of Western benevolence. China did not receive charity, and the West did not act out of kindness or error born of goodwill. Both sides pursued their own interests within a shared institutional framework.
China’s success stemmed from how effectively it used the window that globalization and WTO membership provided—often more effectively than its counterparts expected. Western overconfidence created space; Chinese discipline, coordination, and strategic execution determined the outcome. In this sense, China’s rise was neither an accident nor a gift, but the product of a mutually beneficial bargain whose consequences evolved unevenly over time. Gratitude is therefore unnecessary; realism offers a more accurate and durable foundation for understanding the past and managing the future.
References
- Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. By Ha-Joon Chang, 2007
- Kicking Away the Ladder: An Unofficial History of Capitalism, Especially in Britain and the United States. By Ha-Joon Chang, 2002