The U.S. optimized for efficiency, innovation, and globalization. China optimized for control, scale, and industrial learning.
In The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West (2025), Alexander C. Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska argue that the United States, particularly Silicon Valley, has the potential to revive a mission-driven technological culture, but only by breaking free from the ideological constraints that have dominated since the 1980s. These … Read more
In The Technological Republic (2025), Alexander C. Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska explore Western, particularly U.S., anxiety over China, framing it as a strategic concern rather than a mere cultural or economic rivalry. The authors argue that this anxiety stems from a fear of losing technological, military, and geopolitical dominance at a time when the … Read more
In The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West (2025), Alexander C. Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska argue that Western technology ecosystems—most notably Silicon Valley—drifted away from strategically consequential “hard tech,” becoming instead preoccupied with convenience, lifestyle innovation, and short-term shareholder value. This shift, they contend, left critical domains of … Read more
In The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West (2025), Alexander C. Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska present China not only as a technological and commercial rival, but as the central catalyst for a profound moment of reckoning for the West. While the prevailing discourse in Silicon Valley often vacillates … Read more
The idea of a “Cold War 2.0” has effectively collapsed in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Scholars such as John Ikenberry and Christopher Layne have long argued that NATO’s eastward expansion reflected a broader Western strategy: to consolidate post–Cold War power, contain Russia, and integrate former Soviet satellites into the Western orbit. Whether intended … Read more
China’s technological upgrading is good for ordinary Chinese people because income, dignity, and living standards are structurally determined by who controls high-end tools of production. By moving up the technological value chain, China enables surplus value that once leaked abroad to remain within the domestic economy, where it can be redistributed through higher wages, lower … Read more
While China’s emergence as a global power is often credited to the post-1978 Reform and Opening-up era, the first thirty years of the People’s Republic of China (1949–1979) established the critical structural, social, and strategic foundations that continue to shape its trajectory. This period of intense national mobilization, austerity, and long-term planning enabled China to … Read more
U.S. efforts to reshore manufacturing are unlikely to succeed because they confront structural, historical, and systemic constraints fundamentally different from those that enabled China’s industrial rise. China’s emergence as a global manufacturing powerhouse—the third fully industrialized nation after Britain and the United States—was not a market-led accident, but the result of a long foundational period … Read more
In the early 1990s, China’s consumer electronics industry lagged far behind its Western counterparts, lacking both purchasing power and advanced manufacturing capabilities. Faced with the high costs and technical barriers of dominant international standards such as VHS and LaserDisc, Chinese innovators pursued a pragmatic alternative. In 1993, Jiang Wanmeng and Sun Yansheng, working with C-Cube, … Read more
The United States possesses extraordinary technological, financial, and human capital, yet it faces persistent structural barriers to executing coherent and sustained industrial policy. These obstacles are institutional rather than ideological: industrial policy demands long time horizons, dense coordination, and leadership continuity, while the U.S. political system is optimized for short electoral cycles, adversarial competition, and … Read more