The U.S. shed factories and the skills around them, while China accepted inefficiency to build complete industrial systems and long-term manufacturing power.
The idea of a “Cold War 2.0” has effectively collapsed in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Scholars such as John Ikenberry and Christopher Layne have long argued that NATO’s eastward expansion reflected a broader Western strategy: to consolidate post–Cold War power, contain Russia, and integrate former Soviet satellites into the Western orbit. Whether intended … Read more
China’s post–reform rise is neither accidental nor a mere byproduct of globalization; it reflects sustained comparative learning from the successes and failures of twentieth-century development paths. Across cases as varied as Japan, South Korea, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Latin America, a consistent pattern emerges: long-run growth is shaped less by market openness, … Read more
Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway’s The Big Myth: How American Business Taught Us to Loathe Government and Love the Free Market (2023) challenges the assumption that U.S. commitment to free-market fundamentalism is natural or inevitable, arguing instead that it is the product of a sustained, century-long ideological campaign aimed at undermining public confidence in … Read more
The implications of Sino–U.S. technological competition and global hegemony cannot be understood through the narrow lens of trade policy or export-control mechanisms alone. Rather, they emerge from a deeper interaction between historical trauma, systematic technology denial, and China’s capacity for industrial-scale adaptation. Together, these forces have reshaped China’s national strategy and are now transforming the … Read more
China’s rise to near-peer status with the West reflects deliberate strategic choices rather than chance. While the United States and much of Europe gradually abandoned industrial density—treating manufacturing as expendable, subordinating engineers to finance, and assuming globalization and symbolic dominance would secure permanent advantage—China embraced production as a civilizational foundation. It built dense industrial ecosystems, … Read more
China’s resistance to financialization at the corporate level is not a moral stance but a systemic survival strategy. In sectors where technological competition has become a protracted war of attrition—such as semiconductors, 5G, and high-speed rail—short-term financialism equates to strategic suicide. The enduring strength of China’s manufacturing lies in its institutional resilience, which allows for … Read more
General Electric’s trajectory can be best understood in comparative perspective, alongside other major conglomerates that confronted the same late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century economic environment marked by financialization, technological disruption, regulatory change, and intensified global competition. While some conglomerates collapsed under excessive leverage, opaque financial arms, or strategic overreach, others fragmented deliberately, dismantling diversified structures that had … Read more
As Lights Out: Pride, Delusion, and the Fall of General Electric makes clear, GE’s decline cannot be understood in isolation from the economic environment and political landscape in which it operated. These external forces did not cause the company’s internal failures; rather, they amplified and exposed them, and once conditions shifted, they ensured that those … Read more
In Lights Out: Pride, Delusion, and the Fall of General Electric, GE’s decline, set against Huawei’s rise, highlights a fundamental divergence in how large organizations confront pride, complexity, and long-term strategy. As Gryta and Mann show, GE became captive to its own legacy and to Wall Street expectations, relying on financial engineering and optimistic narratives … Read more
The United States cannot replicate China’s Gaokao-centered talent model in its institutional form, but it can reproduce several of its functional effects within a liberal-democratic, market-based system. The binding constraint is not technical capacity but political structure: what China achieves through centralized authority and direct administrative control, the U.S. must pursue through federated incentives, funding … Read more