This ideological shift replaced the industrial-era maxim “What’s good for GM is good for America” with the credo “What’s good for Wall Street is good for America.” In the context of this transition, the hollowing out of the real economy raises a critical question: how could the U.S. over-financialize while still needing a strong industrial … Read more
U.S. policy circles in the 1980s and 1990s did not widely anticipate China as a peer competitor in the 2020s, at least not in the sense of a strategic rival matching U.S. technological and economic power. Context in the 1980s/1990s In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. strategic attention was heavily focused on the Cold War … Read more
Jack Welch, the former CEO of General Electric, embodied Milton Friedman’s doctrine of shareholder primacy, translating it into corporate practice. Yet, Welch was only one among many. The transformation from an industrial-based to a financialized U.S. economy was driven by a broader ensemble of influential actors across business, policymaking, and academia. Intellectual / Ideological Architects … Read more
China faces an asymmetric playing field — the U.S., Europe, Russia, Japan, and India can trade sensitive technologies among themselves, but China is systematically excluded. This creates a global industrial ecosystem where China is now the world’s sole manufacturing superpower. The Manufacturing Superpower Asymmetry Richard Baldwin’s observation is striking: China now produces more than the … Read more
The ideological transformation in the United States over the past several decades marked a profound shift in economic priorities, replacing the industrial-age maxim “What’s good for GM is good for America” with the modern credo “What’s good for Wall Street is good for America.” This change reflected a broader reorientation of the economy from production-centered … Read more
The theories of Seymour Martin Lipset, Adam Przeworski, and Francis Fukuyama fostered complacency and hubris within policymaking circles following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Collectively, these frameworks shaped U.S. and Western strategic thinking after 1991, contributing to miscalculations that inadvertently facilitated China’s emergence as both a global manufacturing hub and a technological innovation powerhouse. … Read more
From the 1990s through the 2010s, many Western policymakers believed that China’s rapid economic modernization would naturally result in political liberalization—or else lead to stagnation. This view, grounded in liberal teleology, modernization theory, and the triumphalism that followed the Cold War, proved misguided. It bred complacency in Western strategy, postponed effective policy responses, and ultimately … Read more
The persistence of the belief among many U.S. experts, pundits, and policymakers that China can never truly catch up technologically and thus poses no fundamental threat, is deeply rooted in a conviction that there is only one “recipe” for innovation success: the Washington Consensus model of free markets, strong IP rights, and limited government. This … Read more
The concept of the U.S. fostering its foundational education and producing enough STEM graduates to meet its own needs, rather than relying on imported talent, is a widely discussed and highly sought-after goal. Nevertheless, realizing it is extremely difficult due to a combination of systemic educational shortcomings and broader societal factors. Challenges in the U.S. … Read more
When China introduced the “Made in China 2025” (MIC2025) initiative in 2015, many Western policymakers and academics initially reacted with a mix of alarm and skepticism, with some believing it would lead to a Soviet Union-style central planning collapse. The “Failed History” of Central Planning (Soviet Model) Western observers often viewed China’s Made in China … Read more